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UNITED STATES V. KINCADE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL
DNA ACT: WHY WE'LL NEED A NEW PAIR
OF GENES TO WEAR DOWN THE SLIPPERY
SLOPE
KATHRYN ZUNNOt
Privacy erodes first at the margins, but once eliminated, its
protections are lost for good, and the resultant damage cannot be
undone. 1
INTRODUCTION
Breakthroughs in technology have revolutionized the war on
crime by aiding law enforcement officials in virtually every type
of criminal investigation. 2 Since 1986, the most increasingly
utilized crime-solving weapon has been the analysis of
deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") artifacts found at crime scenes in
t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2002,
Columbia University.
1 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Kincade 1], reh'g en banc granted, 354 F.3d 1000, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc,
379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Kincade 17], cert. denied, 544 U.S. __, 125
S.Ct 1638 (2005).
2 See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest
Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 768, 812-13 (1999) (indicating
that "machines are taking over the role of primary crime fighters" and "assisting
human detectives to catch thieves, murderers, tax evaders, etc., through remote
listening and recording devices, wire tapping, breaking into computer records, and
particularly through mechanized fingerprint matching"); Manning A. Connors, III,
Comment, DNA Databases: The Case for the Combined DNA Index System, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 889, 889 (1994) (calling DNA analysis "a revolutionary prosecutorial
weapon for law enforcement"); Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An
Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185, 185
(1996) (declaring that the "world is in the midst of... the genetic revolution"); see
also Melba Newsome, Rape Is Never Fair, Especially If the Rapist Is Untouchable,
L.A. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 27, 2002, at 10 (declaring that the "use of DNA evidence
can revolutionize the way crime is fought [and] [n]ot since fingerprinting has law
enforcement had such a powerful ally").
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order to identify criminals accurately. 3 These DNA artifacts
contain the genetic "blueprint" of life that is unique to each
individual and thus to the perpetrator of a given crime. 4 DNA
evidence can not only identify a criminal offender, but it can also
reveal an enormous amount of personal information about that
particular individual. 5 Nevertheless, it is the "uniqueness" of
DNA evidence that has enabled it to become an essential part of
criminal investigations and an extremely reliable source of
3 See Hibbert, supra note 2, at 768. For further background, see the report of
the House of Representatives on the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000,
H.R. REP. No. 106-900(1) (2000) [hereinafter DNA Act House Report], as reprinted
in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2323 (noting that "[tihe emergence of DNA identification
technology is one of the most significant advances in criminal identification methods
since the advent of fingerprinting"); Virna M. Manuel, Note, State DNA Data Base
and Data Bank Expansion Laws: Is It Time for California To Expand Its DNA Data
Base Law To Include All Convicted Felons?, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 339 (2004)
(highlighting the advent of DNA technology as an "essential part" of criminal
investigations due to its "potential and.., importance ... for solving crimes"); Rutt
Bridges, Catching Criminals in the DNA Web, BLUEPRINT MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 2000,
available at http://www.ndol.org/print.cfm?contentid=2154 (commenting that
currently "some of the nation's most effective crime fighters don't wear blue
uniforms," but rather "white lab coats [to] study DNA fingerprinting"). DNA
evidence "can be found almost everywhere" because a single cell provides enough
DNA to be analyzed and duplicated into a DNA "fingerprint." Id. For example,
"[b]urglars leave blood samples when breaking and entering[, a]ssailants shed hair
and skin cells in fights[, t]errorists and kidnappers inadvertently convict themselves
by licking the envelope of a ransom note[, and ciriminals of every ilk deposit saliva
on glasses, telephones, and cigarette butts and leave spittle and sweat stains." Id.
The first conviction in America in a case that used DNA evidence occurred in 1987,
when DNA samples of semen retrieved at a crime scene matched blood drawn from
serial rapist Tommie Lee Andrews, who is now serving a twenty-two years prison
sentence for rape, aggravated burglary, and burglary. See Hibbert, supra note 2, at
773. In 1987, no state had a DNA databank, but "just ten years after the Andrews
case was decided, all fifty states had laws requiring DNA samples from at least
convicted sex offenders." See id. at 773-74.
4 See Manuel, supra note 3, at 339. DNA is considered "the fundamental
building block for an individual's entire genetic makeup." NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD
CASES 5 (2002). DNA evidence is extremely reliable "because each person's DNA is
unique (with the exception of identical twins)" who share the exact same genetic
makeup. See id. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE
GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY, at I (1995), available at
http://dcc2.bumc.bu.eduLW/GPA/GENEINTR.pdf (describing DNA as "containing
an individual's 'future diary' ... because it describes an important part of a unique
and personal future").
5 See Hibbert, supra note 2, at 790 (noting that one's DNA profile can reveal
vast amounts of information about one's "physical traits or mental status"); see also
infra note 153 and accompanying text (describing the many different categories of
information that can be derived from an individual's DNA).
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evidence-that is, of course, if law enforcement officials discover
to whom this DNA evidence belongs. 6 To expedite this challenge
for law enforcement officials, the federal government authorized
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") in 1994 to establish a
nationwide, "massive centrally-managed database," 7 called the
Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"), where DNA samples
collected from crime scenes, crime victims, convicted offenders,
and unidentified human remains could be stored.8 The amount
of DNA samples stored on CODIS was greatly expanded when
6 See Hibbert, supra note 2, at 791 ('DNA analysis maps immutable, lifelong
characteristics of an individual. Indeed, immutability is what makes DNA such an
ideal identifier."') (quoting Robert Craig Scherer, Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and
the Fourth Amendment: The Need for a New Post-Skinner Test, 85 GEO. L.J. 2007,
2021 (1997)). The accuracy of DNA evidence also makes convictions more reliable
and "less likely to be overturned." See Manuel, supra note 3, at 343. The reliability of
DNA evidence has been estimated to pinpoint an individual within a probability of
one in several billion. See Bridges, supra note 3; see also DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 11(a)(1)-(2), 114 Stat. 2726, 2735
(2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(1)-(2) (2000)) (indicating that
DNA testing "has emerged as the most reliable forensic technique for identifying
criminals when biological material is left at a crime scene" and due to this "scientific
precision, DNA testing can, in some cases, conclusively establish the guilt or
innocence of a criminal defendant").
7 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 819 (plurality opinion).
8 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 210304(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2070 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132);
see also Violent Offender DNA Identification Act of 1999, DNA Backlog Elimination
Act and Convicted Offender DNA Index System Support Act: Hearing on H.R. 2810,
H.R. 3087, and H.R. 3375 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 89 (2000) (statement of Dwight E. Adams, Deputy Assistant
Director, Forensic Analysis Branch of the FBI) [hereinafter Adams Testimony],
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65302.000/
hju65302_OF.htm (recounting the history of CODIS's development). CODIS was
expanded to include federal crimes with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
Under the AEDPA, however, no legal authority was granted to the executive branch
to collect DNA samples from federal offenders. See infra note 97 and accompanying
text. CODIS uses DNA evidence in two different ways. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: LEGISLATION To ADVANCE JUSTICE THROUGH DNA
TECHNOLOGY (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/dnalegislation.htm. First,
it allows law enforcement to connect unsolved crimes through a common perpetrator
by matching one forensic crime scene sample to another. See id. Second, CODIS can
monitor the criminal activity of known offenders by matching evidence gathered at a
crime scene to a particular offender's posted profile. See id. A cold hit occurs when
DNA analysis of a crime scene sample with no suspect matches a profile in a
database of previously convicted offenders, a database of samples from those
individuals arrested for specified crimes, or a database of other crime scene profiles.
See id.
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Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000 ("DNA Act"),9 which gave law enforcement the authority
under federal law to require the extraction of DNA from any
individual in prison or on probation, parole, or supervised
release, so long as he or she had been convicted of a "qualifying
[flederal offense." 10 Pursuant to this authority, the FBI requires
those in federal custody who are subject to the DNA Act to
submit to compulsory blood sampling.11 This forcible blood
9 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2000). "[AIll 50 states [had] legislation authorizing the
collection of DNA samples from [certain] categories of convicted offenders" before the
DNA Act was passed. See Adams Testimony, supra note 8. Thus, the DNA Act was
passed largely to address the significant backlog of unanalyzed DNA samples within
the states' DNA database programs. See id. (indicating that "the majority of states'
analyses efforts are unable to keep pace with the collection of these convicted
offender samples" and that "[f]ederal legislation would correct this imbalance"); see
also Violent Offender DNA Identification Act of 1999, DNA Backlog Elimination Act
and Convicted Offender DNA Index System Support Act: Hearing on H.R. 2810, H.R.
3087, and H.R. 3375 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. of the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 51 (2000) (testimony of Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman) [hereinafter Gilman
Testimony], available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju65302.000/hju65302_0.htm (explaining that "the high volume of convicted
offender samples awaiting to be analyzed, expansion efforts by the states and a lack
of support for our nation's DNA laboratories, have resulted in a growing nationwide
backlog of approximately 700,000 unanalyzed convicted offender DNA samples" and
have further caused "a backlog of evidence for cases for which there are no suspects).
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL FORENSIC
DNA STUDY REPORT, (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pdfl
dna-studyreport-final.pdf. Because all fifty states required DNA collection from
designated convicted offenders by 2000, the DNA Act was viewed as a way to "close
[the] loophole" by requiring DNA samples from federal offenders as well. See id.
10 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2); see infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text
(discussing and listing some of the qualifying offenses). Once the blood sample is
taken, it is turned over to the FBI for analysis. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132(a), 14133.
The FBI utilizes the profiling technology called Short Tandem Repeats ("STR"),
which measures DNA only at thirteen specific sites that are "highly variable from
one person to another." Bridges, supra note 3; see also Manuel, supra note 3, at 339-
40. "[A] unique DNA fingerprint" can be created based on the count of these
stuttered repeats. See Bridges, supra note 3; see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 5-7 (detailing the different forms of
DNA analysis, including STR technology). The results of this analysis are then
posted on the CODIS database and are "permanently available for future use in
connection with the investigation and prosecution of crimes." Kincade I, 345 F.3d at
1097. Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials conducting investigations
can then compare profiles on CODIS with DNA evidence found at crime scenes in
order to identify and prosecute the perpetrator. See infra note 91 and accompanying
text (explaining the structure of the CODIS database and the interaction between
each hierarchal tier).
11 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 817 (plurality opinion). The DNA Act does not
prescribe any particular method for collecting the DNA samples, but defines a "DNA
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sampling for DNA profiling "unquestionably implicates [an
individual's] right to personal security,"'1 2 and thus, constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 13 Because this search does
not require any suspicion that an individual "will commit or has
committed another offense,"'14 serious concerns have been raised
over whether this process violates the Fourth Amendment right
of those subject to the DNA Act "to be secure in their
persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures."'15
Recently, in United States v. Kincade ("Kincade I'),16 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed this
issue and concluded that the compulsory DNA profiling of
qualified convicted offenders comports with the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment, and thus upheld searches pursuant to
the DNA Act as constitutional. 17
In Kincade II, the appellant-probationer, Thomas Cameron
sample" as "a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample of an individual on which a DNA
analysis can be carried out." 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(1). Sources of DNA that may be
analyzed "include saliva, skin cells, bone, teeth, tissue, urine, and feces." See
Kincade I, 345 F.3d at 1099 n.11. The federal government's nationwide formal policy
that all those covered by the DNA Act be subject to compulsory blood extraction is
largely based on the rationale that DNA information derived from blood samples is
more reliable and easier to test and preserve than DNA extracted by other methods.
See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 817 (plurality opinion). See generally Nancy Beatty
Gregoire, Federal Probation Joins the World of DNA Collection, 66 FED. PROBATION
30, 30 (2002). It is interesting to consider whether the analysis of the
constitutionality of this search would remain the same if the search were less
intrusive-for example, via a hair sample or a swab of mouth cells. This, however, is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
12 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 821 n.15 (plurality opinion).
13 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1987) ("We
have long recognized that a 'compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood. . . ' must
be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.") (alteration in original) (quoting
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966)); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("[Blood] testing procedures plainly constitute searches of
'persons'.. . within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment."). Because blood
extraction is considered a search, it is subject to normal Fourth Amendment
requirements. See United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000)
("Intrusions into the human body, including the taking of blood, are searches subject
to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment."); see also Bonnie L. Taylor, Comment,
Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted Persons and the Debate Over DNA Database
Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 509, 516 (2003) ("DNA sampling-like any other
form of search and seizure-is subject to the constraints of reasonableness.").
14 See Kincade I, 345 F.3d at 1097.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
17 Id. at 832, 839-40.
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Kincade, challenged the constitutionality of the DNA Act by
arguing that its authorization of forcible blood extraction violated
his Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures.18 In 1993, the appellant pleaded guilty to and was
convicted of armed bank robbery, which is an offense listed in the
DNA Act as grounds for DNA extraction, 19 and was sentenced to
ninety-seven months incarceration followed by a three-year term
of supervised release. 20  Toward the end of his period of
supervised release, the appellant was ordered by his probation
officer to submit to a blood extraction pursuant to the DNA Act.21
He refused, and was then arrested and imprisoned for violating
his supervised release 22-a punishment that he soon contested on
constitutional grounds.23  The district court rejected his
18 Id. at 821.
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(1)(E) (2000).
20 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 820 (plurality opinion). Supervised release, which is a
form of government supervision after a term of imprisonment, was established
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a reform to parole. See generally Harold
Baer, Jr., The Alpha and Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REV. 267 (1996).
Unlike parole, which has the effect of reducing an inmate's term of imprisonment,
supervised release is an additional term of supervision that follows the period of
imprisonment imposed by a court. See id. at 269. The terms of Kincade's supervised
release included requirements "to participate in [a] ... substance abuse program; [to
refrain from] commit[ting] another federal, state, or local crime; and to follow the
instructions of his probation officer." Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 820 (plurality opinion).
The enactment of the DNA Act took place at about the same time that Kincade was
being released from prison. See Milton Hirsch & David Oscar Markus, Fourth
Amendment Forum: Involuntary Blood Testing. United States v. Kincade, 27
CHAMPION 40, 40 (2004).
21 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 820 (plurality opinion).
22 Id. at 821. The failure "to cooperate in the collection of [a] sample" under the
DNA Act is a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year's imprisonment and
a fine of as much as $100,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 2004); 18
U.S.C. §§ 3571(b)(5) & 3581(b)(6) (Supp. 2001). By refusing to submit to DNA
sampling under the DNA Act, Kincade breached two mandatory conditions of his
supervised release. The first condition was that he shall not commit an additional
federal, state, or local offense. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(1), 3583(d) (Supp. 2001); see
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5B1.3(a)(1), 5D1.3(a)(1). The second
condition was that he submit to DNA sampling. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(9), 3583(d)
(Supp. 2001); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5B1.3(a)(10),
5D1.3(a)(8) (2004). If an individual violates his or her terms of probation or
supervised release, the sentencing court is authorized to revoke or to extend the
conditions of his or her release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3564(d)-(e), 3565(a), 3583(e)(2)-(3)
(Supp. 2001).
23 In briefing to the district court, Kincade argued that the DNA Act violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the separation of powers
principles embodied in Article III and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
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constitutional challenge and ruled that his refusal to submit to a
compulsory blood extraction violated his supervised release
condition to obey his probation officer.2 4 A three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals voted 2-1 to reverse,
concluding that forcible 25 blood extractions pursuant to the DNA
Act violated the Fourth Amendment because they are conducted
in the absence of individualized suspicion. 26 In January 2004,
the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc and reconsider
whether searches of probationers 27 pursuant to the DNA Act
violated the Fourth Amendment.28
In reaching its decision as to whether the Fourth
Amendment permits compulsory DNA profiling of certain
conditionally released federal offenders in the absence of
individualized suspicion that they have committed additional
crimes, the Ninth Circuit was primarily guided by United States
v. Knights,29 a recent Supreme Court case that held that a
warrantless search of a probationer's apartment by law
See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 821 (plurality opinion). On appeal, however, Kincade
only raised the Fourth Amendment objection. See id. at 821 n. 13.
24 See id. at 821. Because Kincade violated his supervised release, the district
court sentenced him to four months imprisonment and a prolonged two year period
of supervised release. See id. While the appeal was pending and while Kincade was
serving his additional period of supervised release, he tested positive for drug use.
See id. As a result, he was taken into custody and forced to give a DNA sample. See
id.
25 The blood extraction authorized by the DNA Act certainly has the potential to
be just that-forcible. See, e.g., Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493, 1496 (E.D.
Wash. 1993) (illustrating the chaotic situation that results when a prisoner refuses
to give a blood sample, which involves the prisoner being directed to a strip search
room without being notified why, placed in wrist, ankle, and waist restraints, and
then subjected to forcible blood extraction).
26 KincadeI, 345 F.3d at 1113.
27 It is important to note that courts do not distinguish between parolees,
probationers, and supervised releasees while analyzing a Fourth Amendment search
or seizure. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987); Green v.
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); United States
v. Hebert, 201 F.3d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902,
909 (3d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 n.1 (9th Cir.
1991) ("[W]e see [no] constitutional difference between probation and parole for
purposes of the fourth amendment.").
28 See United States v. Kincade, 354 F.3d 1000, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). For a
concise summary of the procedural history of the case, see Electronic Privacy
Information Center, United States v. Kincade: Introduction & Procedural History,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/ kincade! (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
29 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
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enforcement did not violate the Fourth Amendment,30 and Rise v.
Oregon,31 a 1995 Ninth Circuit decision that upheld the
constitutionality of a similar state DNA collection statute. 32
Using the same analytical approach employed in these two cases,
the Ninth Circuit embraced the "totality of the circumstances"
test, which balances the level of the searched individual's
expectation of privacy, the extent of intrusion caused by the
search, and the governmental and public interests in conducting
the search.33 The Ninth Circuit applied this "totality of the
circumstances" test to the facts of Kincade II and concluded that:
(1) a probationer has a diminished expectation and right of
privacy because he or she has been convicted of violating the
law;34 (2) a blood extraction is a minimally intrusive search
30 Id. at 121-22. In Knights, the Supreme Court used the "totality of the
circumstances" test to balance the invasion of Knight's interest in privacy against
the state's interest in conducting a warrantless search of his home. See id. at 118-
19. The Supreme Court found that the "probation condition... significantly
diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 119-20. Furthermore,
the Court found that since a probationer is more likely than the ordinary citizen to
violate the law, the state has an interest in conducting warrantless searches upon
his or her home in order to protect better potential victims of crime. See id. at 120-
21. The Court concluded that the government needs "no more than reasonable
suspicion to conduct a search of [a] probationer's house." Id. at 121.
31 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
32 Id. at 1562. In Rise, a state DNA collection statute, which is very similar to
the federal DNA Act, was upheld by the Ninth Circuit using a "pure totality of the
circumstances analysis." Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 831 (plurality opinion); see also
infra Part III (discussing this methodology). The plurality in Kincade H did not
discuss Rise in depth, but made clear that it was evaluating Kincade II in light of
Ninth Circuit precedent, which arose from the results of the Rise decision. See
Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 832 (plurality opinion).
33 See infra Part III for an in-depth discussion of this analytical approach.
34 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 833 (plurality opinion) (citing McKune v. Lile, 536
U.S. 24, 36 (2002)). The plurality also contended that the probation system
"render[s] all kinds of individual choices--choices that otherwise would be privately
considered, privately determined, and privately undertaken-matters of legitimate
government concern and investigation." Id. at 834. Due to a probationer's
diminished right to privacy, the plurality concluded that "the government has a far
more substantial interest in invading [his or her] privacy than it does in interfering
with the liberty of law-abiding citizens." Id. The plurality, however, makes sure to
point out that its "holding in no way intimates that conditional releasees' diminished
expectations of privacy serve to extinguish their ability to invoke the protections of
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Id. at 835. Thus, if a conditional releasee is subject to a search that does not satisfy
the "totality of the circumstances" test, then that individual is offered constitutional
relief, "just like any other citizen." Id.
[Vol. 79:769
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because such tests are "commonplace" in our society, 35 involve
"virtually no risk, trauma, or pain,"36 and reveal only a record of
one's identity;37 and (3) society has an "overwhelming,"38
"undeniably compelling," 39  and "monumental"40  interest in
searches under the DNA Act because they ensure that a
probationer complies with the requirements of his or her
release,41 reduce recidivism by deterring probationers from
committing future crimes, 42 and aid in solving past crimes in
order to "bring closure to countless victims." 43  By balancing
these three factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that DNA
profiling of qualified federal offenders is reasonable given the
"totality of the circumstances." 44  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
held that the DNA Act satisfied the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, and affirmed the judgment and accompanying
sentence of the district court. 45
Judge Ronald M. Gould, concurring, believed that the court
should have affirmed under a "special needs" theory,46 rather
35 Id. at 836 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625
(1989) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966))).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 837 n.32. ("Those who have suffered a lawful conviction lose an interest
in their identity to a degree well-recognized as sufficient to entitle the government
permanently to maintain a verifiable record of their identity .... ); see also Rise, 59
F.3d at 1560 ("Once a person is convicted of one of the felonies included as predicate
offenses under [a DNA profiling act], his identity has become a matter of state
interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying
information derived from the blood sampling."). But cf. infra note 153 and
accompanying text (explaining that a DNA sample reveals more about a person than
simply his or her identity).
38 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 838 (plurality opinion).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 839.
41 See id. at 838.
42 See id. at 839.
43 Id.
44 Id. The Ninth Circuit stressed the 'limited nature of [its] holding" as applying
only to those on supervised release and urged the dissenting judges to "recognize the
obvious and significant distinction between the DNA profiling of law-abiding
citizens.., and lawfully adjudicated criminals whose proven conduct substantially
heightens the government's interest in monitoring them." Id. at 835-36.
45 See id. at 839-40. Monica Knox, Kincade's attorney, publicly stated that she
would ask the Supreme Court for review. See Jeff Chorney, As 9th OKs DNA
Profiling, Dissent Cries Big Brother, RECORDER, Aug. 19, 2004, at 1. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court denied Kincade's petition for a writ of certiorari. Kincade v.
United States, 544 U.S. _, 125 S.Ct 1638 (2005).
46 The "special needs" doctrine first appeared in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
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than under the "totality of the circumstances" approach. 47 Judge
Gould argued that the DNA Act authorizes searches that serve
the "special needs" of a supervised release system by "monitoring
convicts on supervised release and deterring their possible
recidivism."48 Therefore, because searches pursuant to the DNA
Act help to ensure that the "goals [that] lie at the heart of
supervised release"49 are realized, Judge Gould felt that they
meet the exception to the Fourth Amendment that permits
warrantless searches when there is a sufficient showing of
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."50
Judge Reinhardt wrote the first of three dissents. He firmly
maintained that the Constitution requires individualized
suspicion for law enforcement searches, such as those authorized
by the DNA Act.51 In addition, as Judge Gould opined, Judge
Reinhardt believed that the "special needs" analysis, rather than
the "totality of the circumstances" test, should have governed the
analysis of the case. 52 Judge Reinhardt, however, concluded that
325 (1985), in Justice Blackmun's concurrence, where he stated that there are
certain cases that would allow for exceptions to the warrant and probable-cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
This situation, however, would only present itself "in those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Id.; see also infra
Part IV for a more in depth analysis of the "special needs" doctrine.
47 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 840 (Gould, J., concurring). In addition, Judge
Gould pointed out the limits of the plurality's decision by noting that the Ninth
Circuit did not have before it "a petitioner who has fully paid his or her debt to
society, who has completely served his or her term, and who has left the penal
system." Id. at 841. Judge Gould commented that this situation raises "[a] nice
question"--that is, "whether DNA samples, though lawfully obtained from a felon on
supervised release, may properly be retained by the government after the felon has
finished his or her term and has paid his or her debt to society." Id. at 842; see infra
Part V (proposing a solution to this dilemma).
48 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 840 (Gould, J., concurring) ("[T]he DNA program is
likely to deter future crime of the supervised releasee because it increases the
chance that a person on supervised release will be caught if he or she commits a new
crime.").
49 Id.
50 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See infra Part IV.A
(discussing the evolution of the "special needs" doctrine).
51 See Kincade I, 379 F.3d at 851-53 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Because
searches pursuant to the DNA Act are conducted without any heightened level of
suspicion that the searched individual has committed or will commit a crime in the
future, Judge Reinhardt urged that the requirement of individualized suspicion was
not met. See id.
52 See id. at 863. Judge Reinhardt believed that applying the "special needs"
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searches pursuant to the DNA Act do not meet the narrow
"special needs" exception because they are suspicionless searches
exercised with the immediate objective of furthering the general
needs of law enforcement. 53  Furthermore, Judge Reinhardt
argued that even if the plurality was correct in applying the
"sweeping"54 and "malleable"55 "totality of the circumstances"
test, it yielded the wrong outcome because: (1) probationers and
parolees still maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy, not a
complete diminution of privacy;56 (2) forcible blood extraction for
DNA profiling is extremely intrusive, given the physical puncture
of the skin and, more importantly, the enormous amount of
information that it can provide about the searched individual for
the rest of his or her life;57 and (3) governmental interest in this
search, which is to aid in the "normal, everyday needs of law
enforcement," was completely overstated by the plurality. 58
Therefore, the "totality of the circumstances" test should have
revealed that the search at issue was not constitutionally
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 59  Lastly, Judge
Reinhardt passionately warned about the many dangers that
arise from both the plurality's "boundless" 60 methodology and the
approval of a regime of suspicionless searches used for general
exception to justify the search at issue "would also have drastic adverse
consequences for our Fourth Amendment protections," id. at 843 n.1, because it
"obliterates the distinction between law enforcement and non-law enforcement
purposes." Id. at 843-44.
53 See id. at 855-60. These general needs of law enforcement, according to Judge
Reinhardt, include "produc[ing] and maintain[ing] evidence relating to ordinary
criminal wrongdoing." Id. at 843. A search with the immediate objective of
furthering the general needs of law enforcement is not permissible under the
"special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 860; see also infra Part
IV.
54 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 842 n.1 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 844.
56 See id. at 868.
57 See id. at 867-68.
58 See id. at 868-69.
59 See id. at 869.
60 Id. at 860. By "boundless," Judge Reinhardt meant that under the "totality of
the circumstances" test, "any person who experiences a reduction in his expectation
of privacy would be susceptible to having his blood sample extracted and included in
CODIS." Id. at 844; see also infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (listing the
numerous groups of individuals deemed by case law to have reduced expectations of
privacy). Furthermore, this legal standard "imposes no significant limits on
arbitrary and invasive government actions." Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 844 (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
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law enforcement purposes. 61 He believed that this methodology
abolishes the Fourth Amendment's general requirement that
searches be based on individualized suspicion and leaves us all at
risk of being subject to involuntary DNA profiling, among other
forms of government intrusion, in the very near future.62
Furthermore, Judge Reinhardt envisioned that the ramifications
of approving such a search include "all of the dangers inherent in
allowing the government to collect and store information about
its citizens in a centralized place,"63 such as discrimination,
exploitation, surveillance, and harassment. 64
The dissenting opinions of both Judge Kozinski and Judge
Hawkins reiterated many of the same concerns addressed by
Judge Reinhardt. Judge Kozinski remained "skeptical" of the
searches authorized by the DNA Act in order to help solve future
crime because the searched individuals' DNA profiles are kept on
file for the rest of their lives-far after they have "paid [their]
debt to society."65 Instituting the search at issue with the goal of
solving future crime, in Judge Kozinski's opinion, is a "huge end
run around the Fourth Amendment."66  In addition, Judge
Kozinski pointed out that the Fourth Amendment intrusion at
issue is not merely the extraction of blood, but rather the seizure
of a DNA profile and its inclusion in a database for the rest of the
searched person's life, which has far more serious ramifications. 67
Furthermore, he explained that under the "mushy" "totality of
61 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 843-45, 850-51, 860, 863-66, 869-71 (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
62 See id. at 843. Judge Reinhardt found this argument especially compelling
given that CODIS today is not nearly as limited as the one initially enacted by
Congress and that further expansion is inevitable due to the increasing pressures to
put DNA stored on CODIS to wider and better use. See id. at 845-51.
63 Id. at 843. Judge Reinhardt also felt that the approval of searches pursuant
to the DNA Act "encourages the very centralization of government authority that
has repeatedly resulted in the sacrifice of our liberties in the name of law
enforcement." Id. at 844.
64 See id. at 843; see also infra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing
dangerous implications that may result from an expansion of CODIS). See generally
Julia Scheeres, Fears About DNA Testing Proposal, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 31, 2003,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,58270,00.html (noting that
genetic discrimination in the United States has a historical precedent from the early
twentieth century when those who were considered mentally unfit to reproduce were
involuntarily sterilized).
65 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 872 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
67 See id. at 873.
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the circumstances" test, it is difficult to imagine that searches
pursuant to the DNA Act would ever violate anyone's Fourth
Amendment rights, which creates the very real possibility that
CODIS will one day easily expand to include the entire
population. 68 Judge Hawkins added that the "special needs"
doctrine should have applied in this case,69 and, more
importantly, that the forcible extraction of blood involved in the
search at issue was constitutionally questionable because, based
on Supreme Court precedent, "no one is required to submit to
'intrusions beyond the body's surface' absent a 'clear indication'
that the desired evidence would be found by such a search."
70
Finally, Judge Hawkins opined that the governmental needs
identified by the plurality simply do not justify such an intrusive,
suspicionless search, the results of which are retained
indefinitely. 71
It is submitted that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that
searches pursuant to the DNA Act comport with the Fourth
Amendment. This Comment argues that these searches, as
currently prescribed by the DNA Act, are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, and thus are unconstitutional. The forcible
extraction of blood for DNA profiling for permanent inclusion on
CODIS is primarily carried out for law enforcement purposes,
which, under Supreme Court precedent, cannot justify a search
conducted in the absence of individualized suspicion. In addition,
the chief justifications used by the Ninth Circuit plurality to
authorize these searches, most notably the reduced expectation of
privacy of probationers and the need to deter recidivism, are
completely inconsistent with the DNA Act as currently
structured and implemented. Furthermore, the confusion among
circuit courts with respect to which method of analysis governs
this legal issue-the "special needs" approach or the "totality of
the circumstances" test-creates many disastrous ramifications,
68 See id. at 872. Judge Kozinski addressed those who are doubtful that CODIS
will expand by pointing to the advent and subsequent aggressive growth of
fingerprinting in America. See id. at 873-74 (tracing the use of fingerprinting from
only "those who had at some point passed through the criminal justice system" to all
civil servants to over forty-seven million people, including those printed during
background checks for non-criminal justice purposes).
69 See id. at 875 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 875 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966)).
71 See id.
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especially given the extreme flexibility of the "totality of the
circumstances" test. This Comment urges the Supreme Court to
address this issue before more intrusive searches like those
authorized by the DNA Act are justified by a "totality of the
circumstances" balancing test. In addition, although this
Comment concludes that the "special needs" analysis should have
governed Kincade II based on precedent, either method of
analysis should lead to the conclusion that searches conducted
pursuant to the DNA Act are unreasonable and unconstitutional.
Lastly, if a compromise must be reached between the conflicting
legal precedents and the immense desire for DNA databases,
some changes to the DNA Act are desperately needed. These
changes will prevent us all from sliding down the "slippery
slope"7 2 and being subject to DNA profiling in the very near
future, and will satisfy both the passionate protectors of civil
liberties and the zealous devotees of law enforcement power.
Parts I and II of this Comment provide essential background
information describing the evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and the history of the CODIS database,
respectively. Part III discusses the "totality of the
circumstances" approach and argues both that precedent does
not support its application to resolve the case at hand and that
the Ninth Circuit's conclusion after conducting this balancing
test was incorrect. Part IV analyzes the "special needs" doctrine
72 See id. at 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (explaining that the evolution of
Fourth Amendment searches reflect present values and mold future values by
"altering what we come to expect from our government," which enables the
government to keep taking "small step[s] beyond the last thing [it] approved"); see
also United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973)
("Each step, when taken, appear[s] a reasonable step in relation to that which
preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been
seriously considered in the first instance."); Violent Offender DNA Identification Act
of 1999, DNA Backlog Elimination Act and Convicted Offender DNA Index System
Support Act: Hearing on H.R. 2810, H.R. 3087, and H.R. 3375 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 178 (2000) (prepared
testimony of Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director, American Civil Liberties Union)
[hereinafter Steinhardt Testimony], available at http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/judiciary/hju65302.000/hju65302 0.htm ("Our country has a long history
of function creep-of databases, which are created for one discrete purpose and,
which despite the initial promises of the [sic] their creators, eventually take on new
functions and purposes."). See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1077-1114 (2003) (discussing how "attitude-
altering slippery slopes" develop through legislative and judicial actions).
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and its application to searches conducted pursuant to the DNA
Act and further contends that the "special needs" doctrine should
have been applied in Kincade II, which would have yielded the
conclusion that the forcible extraction of blood to be used for law
enforcement purposes does not meet this narrow exception. Part
V concludes that searches pursuant to the DNA Act, as currently
written and implemented, should be prohibited as
unconstitutional and recommends, in the alternative, several
changes to the DNA Act in order to comport more successfully
with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. 73
The primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to "safeguard
the privacy and security" of American citizens "against arbitrary
invasions by government officials." 74 The "reasonableness" of a
search depends on adherence to the general constitutional
requirement that it be supported by "probable cause" and
formally approved by an impartial magistrate via issuance of a
warrant prior to its execution. 75  Under certain conditions,
however, law enforcement may execute a search without
obtaining a warrant. 76 The general rule is that these warrantless
searches still must be supported by probable cause, although
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved
73 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
74 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985); see also Camara v. Mun.
Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
75 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528; see also United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972).
7 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (noting this general rule). The limited
circumstances when law enforcement may execute a search without obtaining a
warrant include situations when the warrantless search is necessary to yield
evidence that might be destroyed in the time it takes to obtain a warrant, see, e.g.,
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004), or to search an arrestee for
weapons that may threaten police safety, see, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762-63 (1969).
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considerably over the years and has recognized certain limited
circumstances that allow a more relaxed degree of individual
suspicion than probable cause to justify a search, namely
reasonable suspicion. 77 Additionally, there is an even more
narrow and discrete category of searches that are free from the
warrant and individualized suspicion requirements, yet that
have been held to comport with the Fourth Amendment
requirement of reasonableness. 78  This category is the most
limited because the historical background of the Fourth
Amendment demonstrates that the Framers of the Constitution
faithfully believed that general warrants and searches conducted
in the absence of reasonable and particular suspicion were
intolerable in a democratic society. 79 Nevertheless, this category
of searches is the most relevant to the discussion of Kincade II
because searches pursuant to the DNA Act are conducted both
without a warrant and absent any suspicion that the searched
individual has committed or will commit another crime.8 0
It is helpful to further divide this category of lawful
warrantless and suspicionless searches into three sub-groups.81
The first category involves searches in "exempted areas,"
77 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (authorizing a warrantless
protective pat-down of individuals who police encounter so long as their concerns are
justified by reasonable individualized suspicion of possible danger); see also T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 340-41.
78 See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (discussing cases that fall
within the three subcategories of this group); see also infra notes 191-94 and
accompanying text (providing more examples of lawful warrantless and
suspicionless searches).
79 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959). In Henry, the Court
noted that the general warrant requirement "perpetuated the oppressive practice of
allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion .... And as the early American
decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, common rumor or
report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a
warrant for arrest." Id. (footnotes and citation omitted). More specifically, the
Framers were afraid of blanket suspicionless searches where law enforcement would
go door-to-door and search every house in a given area, which would subject
unlimited numbers of innocent people to harassment, and possibly even involuntary
detention. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969) (summarizing that "the
Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal
security of our citizenry"); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
670 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (adding that the Framers may have considered
"blanket searches" even "more worrisome than the typical general search").
80 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
81 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 822 (plurality opinion) (noting that these
categories "help [to] organize the jurisprudence" in this area).
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including national borders, 82 prisons,8 3 airports, and entrances to
government buildings,8 4 which by virtue of their location create
substantial risks to public safety or destroy the right of privacy of
those confined within these areas. The second category can be
identified as "administrative searches," which include inspections
of closely regulated businesses and other routine regulatory
investigations.8 5 The final category of permissible warrantless
and suspicionless searches can be referred to as "special needs,"
which describes the analytical doctrine that the Supreme Court
has devoted much attention to developing in recent years.8 6 The
"special needs" line of cases will be discussed in more detail later
in this Comment;8 7 however, it is important to note that these
cases typically involve searches "conducted for important non-
law enforcement purposes in contexts where adherence to the
82 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (upholding
suspicionless border searches "pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to
protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this
country"); see also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
83 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches do not apply within the
confines of a prison cell because "society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate
any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell").
84 See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (affirming blanket
suspicionless searches at airports and entrances to federal buildings as."reasonable"
when such searches are carefully regulated to meet a "substantial and real" risk to
public safety); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (weighing
the need of carry-on bag searches at airports to prevent airplane hijacking against
the minimal offensiveness of the intrusion to conclude that these suspicionless
searches were reasonable and in conformity with the Fourth Amendment).
85 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (holding that a
warrantless inspection of commercial premises is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment due to the weakened privacy interests of the owner and the heightened
governmental interest in regulating particular businesses); Camara v. Mun. Court of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535-39 (1967) (authorizing municipal "area
inspections" designed to monitor compliance with building safety codes).
86 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 823 (plurality opinion). The "special needs"
doctrine is derived primarily from two Supreme Court decisions. See Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000); see also infra notes 199-209 and accompanying text (analyzing the effect of
these two cases). In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the searches at issue
were unconstitutional because they did not address "special needs" that are beyond
the normal need for law enforcement. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-84; Edmond, 531
U.S. at 42-43.
87 See infra Part IV (describing and advocating for the use of the "special needs"
approach in Kincade I1).
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warrant-and-probable cause requirement would be
impracticable."88  Because these three categories of lawful
warrantless and suspicionless searches are limited, there
remains an extremely large group of searches "for which
individualized suspicion is nonnegotiable,"8 9 notably, searches of
individuals for the purpose of obtaining evidence of ordinary
criminal wrong-doing. 90
II. CODIS'S HISTORY PROVES THAT ITS EXPANSION IS
INEVITABLE
In order to appreciate and understand fully the dangerous
implications of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kincade II, one
must consider that the present federal CODIS database91 is not
88 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 823 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). This
proposition, however, was complicated when, shortly after the "special needs"
rationale was articulated, the Supreme Court applied it in what appeared to be a
clear law enforcement context. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless search of a probationer's home
under the direction of law enforcement due to the finding that the operation of a
probation system presents a "special need" justifying a departure from the usual
warrant-and-probable cause requirement). But see infra Part IV.C (proposing a
distinction to account for the Court's application of the "special needs" exception in
this context).
89 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 673 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
90 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 853 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (indicating that no
matter how these groups are categorized the "overriding lesson is clear: when the
government wishes to search individuals in order to obtain evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing, some level of individualized suspicion is required"); see also
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (reiterating the requirement
of individualized suspicion in searches undertaken for law enforcement purposes by
holding that it is unconstitutional to require individuals to identify themselves to
police officers absent reasonable suspicion).
91 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at
9-10 (2002); see also FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM
PROGRAM: CODIS-MISSION STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND [hereinafter FBI's
CODIS Program], available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/program.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2005) (explaining that CODIS "blends forensic science and
computer technology into an effective tool for solving violent crimes"). CODIS is a
computer software program that consists of three hierarchical levels-local, state,
and national-which operate in tandem as a nationally distributed database. See id.
The National DNA Index System ("NDIS") is the highest level that enables
laboratories participating in the CODIS Program to exchange and compare DNA
profiles on a national scale. Id. The State DNA Index System ("SDIS") is the middle
tier, which allows the interstate exchange of DNA profiles, and the Local DNA Index
System ("LDIS") is the bottom tier, at which all DNA profiles originate. Id.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, "[t]he tiered approach allows state and
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nearly as limited as the one initially enacted by Congress. 92
CODIS began as a pilot program in 1990,93 but was made a
nationwide program in 1994 with the passage of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 94 which
authorized the FBI to create a national database of DNA samples
collected from crime scenes, crime victims, convicted offenders,
and unidentified human remains. 95  In 1996, CODIS was
expanded to include federal crimes with the passage of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.96 The
Department of Justice, however, concluded that despite this
legislation, Congress had not given the executive branch
local agencies to operate their databases according to their specific legislative or
legal requirements." Id. Thus, because all fifty states have enacted laws authorizing
the collection of DNA samples from convicted offenders for inclusion in DNA
databases, the DNA profiles stored on CODIS are not limited to those of federal
offenders. See id.; see also Taylor, supra note 13, at 513 n.22 (listing all fifty states'
laws). CODIS even contains DNA profiles of individuals who have been convicted of
no crime but have been arrested in Louisiana or Texas. See Sandra J. Carnahan,
The Supreme Court's Primary Purpose Test: A Roadblock to the National Law
Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004) (noting that Louisiana
and Texas have laws that require a DNA sample from all those arrested); see also
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:601-609 (Supp. 2005); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.1471
(Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2003). Due to this trend within the states, Barry Steinhardt,
Associate Director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Program on Technology
and Liberty, stated:
While DNA databases may be useful to identify criminals, I am skeptical
that we will ward off the temptation to expand their use .... In the last ten
years alone we have gone from collecting DNA only from convicted sex
offenders to now including people who have been arrested but never
convicted of a crime.
Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), DNA Databases Hold More
Dangers Than Meet the Eye, ACLU Says (Mar. 23, 2000), available at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID= 7 886 &c=1 2 9 .
92 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 845 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (explaining that
CODIS currently "contains more information about vastly more individuals than it
did when it was first created" and that continual "growth is inevitable").
93 See FBI's CODIS Program, supra note 91.
94 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210304(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2069-70 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132). Included in this act was the DNA Identification Act,
which had three main objectives: (1) to create a DNA advisory board to recommend
quality assurance standards to the FBI; (2) to establish a national DNA
identification index; and (3) to provide funding for the CODIS program and for state
and local laboratories to enhance their DNA testing capabilities. See Adams
Testimony, supra note 8.
95 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act § 210304(a) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132).
96 Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 811(a)(2), 110 Stat. 1214, 1312 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 531).
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sufficient legal authority to collect DNA samples from federal
offenders. 97 Thus, it was not until the passage of the DNA Act in
2000 that probation officers had the power under federal law to
forcibly extract DNA samples from any individual on probation,
parole, or supervised release, so long as he or she had been
convicted of a "qualifying federal offense." 98 It is the enormous
increase in qualifying federal offenses that provides the best
indication that the DNA Act is bound to expand further to
include more and more classes of offenders-or even to extend to
the entire population by eliminating the "qualifying offense"
requirement entirely-in the very near future. 99
In April of 2000, shortly after the DNA Act was enacted,
there were only 210,000 DNA profiles stored on CODIS. 100
Startlingly, as of August, 2004-just over four years later-there
were 91,759 forensic profiles and 1,853,404 convicted offender
profiles in the National DNA Index System ("NDIS") tier of
CODIS. 10 1 This almost exponential growth can be attributed to
the fact that the DNA Act originally included only a narrow list
of "qualifying offenses," but currently "includes a laundry list of
[qualifying] federal crimes ... compiled from more than 200
separate sections of the United States Code.1 02 The former
97 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 845 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(2) (Supp. 2004); 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004); see also
DNA Act House Report, supra note 3 (recounting the history of the CODIS
database); infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text (proving that "qualifying
federal offenses" under the DNA Act have vastly expanded). CODIS uses two
indexes: the forensic index, which contains DNA profiles gathered from crime scenes,
and the offender index, which contains DNA profiles of individuals convicted of
violent crimes (although many states are now expanding legislation to include other
felonies). See FBI's CODIS Program, supra note 91; see also DNA Act House Report,
supra note 3, at 33.
99 This view is supported by many civil rights organizations, most notably the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). See Liza Porteus, FOXNews.com,
Supporters, Critics Debate DNA Database Expansion (May 9, 2003),
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlystory/0,73566,,86390,.-00.html ('We are
steadily heading toward a situation where the government takes everybody's DNA
without any controls."' (quoting Jay Stanley, Communications Director of the
Technology and Liberty Program at the ACLU)). But see infra note 114 and
accompanying text (noting the views of those who support expanding DNA
databanks to the entire population).
100 See FBI's CODIS Program, supra note 91.
101 See id.
102 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 846 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). See 28 C.F.R. § 28.2
(2004) for the most recent list of qualifying federal offenses for purposes of DNA
sample collection under the DNA Act.
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narrow list of qualifying offenses included severe and violent
crimes, such as rape, murder, voluntary manslaughter,
kidnapping, and sexual exploitation and other abuse of
children; 10 3 however, the current list provides evidence that the
government "has not simply chosen to collect DNA samples from
the most hardened criminals or most likely recidivists,"'10 4 but
rather has preferred to exploit and increase the number of DNA
profiles on the database to the fullest extent possible. 10 5 For
example, an extremely limited sampling of current qualifying
offenses under the DNA Act includes spray-painting graffiti on
government property, interfering with or assaulting a mailman
in the course of his or her duties, intentionally cutting, spoiling
or destroying various parts of a vessel, violently impeding
reproductive health service facilities, forcing or intimidating
public works employees to give kickbacks, conspiring in severe
cases of threats or intimidation against any person, engaging in
computer fraud, and interfering with the right to vote. 10 6 In
addition, many present qualifying crimes pertain to the valued
First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly, such as
rioting, incitement, and civil disorder.10 7 Furthermore, other
existing qualifying offenses are so far-reaching that they have
the potential to cover an endless range of unlawful conduct. 08
Based on the current list of qualifying federal offenses, it is
difficult to find "any discernible categories of criminal activities"
that would not qualify an individual for forcible DNA extraction
under the DNA Act. 0 9 Was this the original intention of the
DNA Act? This Comment asserts that the answer to this
103 See DNA Act House Report, supra note 3, § 3(d).
104 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 846 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
105 Id. (claiming that this list results "in countless possible permutations of
qualifying crimes").
106 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 111(a)(1), 2276, 248, 874, 241, 1030, 594 (2000),
respectively; 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (citing each of the aforementioned sections of Title 28
of the United States Code). For a more extensive, but non-exhaustive sampling of
other qualifying offenses, see Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 846-47 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
107 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 231 (applying to various forms of "civil disorder"); id. §
2231 (resisting arrest); id. § 2101 (participating in, promoting, or inciting a riot).
108 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 28.2(i) (including as a "qualifying offense" under the
DNA Act "[a]ny offense that is an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing [qualifying] offenses" (emphasis added)).
109 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 846 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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question is a resounding "no." 110  The current state of the DNA
Act has moved very far away from its original intent to aid in the
prosecution of violent, high-recidivism-rate crimes."'
The vastly expanded number of qualifying offenses under the
DNA Act indicates that CODIS is certain to continue its
exponential expansion, especially when considered together with
the alarming number of individuals awaiting DNA extraction in
the federal system' 12 and the promotional efforts of the federal
government and individual states to increase DNA collection.
More specifically, there is a current attempt underway, both
within state legislatures and Congress, to expand the DNA Act to
all adult arrestees, as well as juvenile offenders. 113 This type of
expansion will breed more pressure to expand until the public
becomes so desensitized with DNA extraction that applying the
110 The legislative history of the DNA Act asserts that one of its goals was to
reduce the "backlog of hundreds of thousands of DNA samples taken from convicted
offenders" given the trend at the state level towards "broader offense coverage for
purposes of DNA sample collection and indexing." DNA Act House Report, supra
note 3, at 27, 33 (noting that a recent review of state systems found that "all states
covered sex offenses, 40 states covered offenses against children, 29 states covered
assault/battery offenses, 22 states covered robberies, 20 states covered burglaries,
and seven states covered all felonies" (footnotes omitted)). This original focus of the
federal DNA Act seems inconsistent with the current enormous number of qualifying
federal offenses under the DNA Act, which would only increase the number of
unanalyzed samples, bringing the original backlog problem back to square one.
- See Hibbert, supra note 2, at 769 (observing that DNA databases were
originally created to help solve crimes involving certain classes of offenders with
statistically high recidivism rates, such as sex offenders and violent felons).
112 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Probation and Parole in the United States, 2003 (July 25, 2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/ppus03pr.htm (indicating that almost 6.9
million individuals have come under some form of correctional supervision in recent
years).
113 See Mark Hansen, DNA Dragnet, A.B.A. J., May 2004, at 43 (noting that
Congress is likely to approve legislation authorizing DNA profiling of juvenile
offenders and adult arrestees). In addition, the state of California is currently trying
to enact "Proposition 69, The DNA Fingerprint Initiative," which would extend its
DNA database laws to apply to all arrestees. See John Wildermuth, Proposition To
Take DNA at Arrest Stirs Privacy Fears, S.F. CHRON., June 12, 2004, at Al; Press
Release, Californians for the DNA Fingerprint Yes on 69, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger Endorses Prop. 69, the DNA Fingerprint Initiative (July 7, 2004),
http://www.forrelease.com/D20040707/sfwlOO.P2.07072004170737.16606.html. This
proposition has met considerable opposition. See generally LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA EDUCATION FUND, IN DEPTH ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 69
(Nov. 2004), available at http://ca.lwv.org/lwvc/edfund/elections/2004nov/
id/prop69.html (listing, inter alia, proposition opponents and their arguments).
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DNA Act to the entire population will easily pass muster with
the public and the courts. 114 Add the current "war on terror" into
the mix and there is even greater incentive to expand the scope of
the DNA Act at the expense of privacy. 115 The current trend
toward even further expansion of CODIS has severely dangerous
implications'1 6 and, accordingly, demands cautious scrutiny of
114 See Hibbert, supra note 2, at 814-15. This is likely to come in the form of a
chain effect-applying the DNA Act to all arrestees will lead to applying it to those
wishing to obtain driver licenses or passports, to extracting DNA from all children at
birth, and then, ultimately, extracting DNA from the entire population. See DANIEL
J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 268 (2003); OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, 101ST CONG., GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA
TESTS 10 (Comm. Print 1990) (indicating that there is pressure to put DNA stored
on CODIS to greater and better use). See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE
OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA
TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 35
(2000) ("Inevitably, there will be the increasing possibility of broadening the
database to include the general public."). There are legal scholars, prominent
politicians, and journalists who advocate extending CODIS to the entire population.
See, e.g., D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality,
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413
(2003); Akhil Reed Amar, A Search for Justice in Our Genes, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2002, at 31 (pushing to extend DNA databases to all citizens); David Seifman,
Getting DNA Samples at Birth Fine with Rudy, N.Y. POST, Dec. 17, 1998, at 34
(discussing former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani's approval of a requirement
for every newborn born in the state to donate a DNA sample to the state databank
for use if the child grows into a criminal).
115 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, §§ 206, 213, 215, 115 Stat. 272, 282, 285-88 (2001) (providing examples of
the government successfully enhancing its investigatory and surveillance authority
in the form of roving wiretaps, "sneak and peak" searches, and business record
searches, respectively, in the absence of judicial supervision and intervention).
116 See Steinhardt Testimony, supra note 72 (asserting that the huge potential
for DNA technology carries "significant risks that highly personal and sensitive
information will fall into the wrong hands, leading to a loss of privacy and genetic
discrimination"). More specifically, these dangers include monitoring, intimidating,
and incarcerating political opponents and disfavored minorities, as well as divulging
genetic profiles to schools, employers, and insurance companies. See supra notes 63-
64 and accompanying text; see also Press Release, Associated Press, Alaska To
Expand DNA Collection (Mar. 7 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/
news/newsprint.cfm?ID=6981&c=129 ('Once the government has this information
about you they keep finding neat new ways to use it."' (quoting Jennifer Rudinger,
Executive Director of the Alaska Civil Liberties Union)); Amar, supra note 114, at 31
(noting that our DNA code can be used in "sinister ways," including threatening a
person's health insurance or blackmailing a person due to information derived about
paternity). In addition, searches pursuant to the DNA Act also threaten the genetic
privacy of all those blood-related to the searched offender. See Hibbert, supra note 2,
at 782-87 (illustrating some complications created during law enforcement
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court decisions-like the plurality's in Kincade II-that carry far
greater repercussions than initially meet the eye.
III. THE SWEEPING "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
Courts confronted with constitutional challenges to the
federal DNA Act and its state law equivalents are divided over
which of two approaches governs this analysis: (1) the "totality of
the circumstances" test; or (2) the "special needs" approach. 117
The Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, various federal district
courts, and at least two state supreme courts, have chosen to
uphold the constitutionality of DNA collection statutes using the
"special needs" approach. 118 On the other hand, "the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits, a Seventh Circuit Judge, numerous federal district
courts, and various state courts have approved compulsory DNA
profiling" by employing the "traditional assessment of
reasonableness"'119 via the "totality of the circumstances" test.120
This Comment asserts that Supreme Court precedent does not
support the application of the "totality of the circumstances" test
to decipher the constitutionality of suspicionless searches
investigations by the similarity of genes among siblings).
117 See infra notes 118 and 120 and accompanying text (listing the various
courts using each approach).
11s See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79-82
(2d Cir. 1999); Vore v. United States Dep't of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133-37
(D. Ariz. 2003); Miller v. United States Parole Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175-
77 (D. Kan. 2003); United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319-23 (D. Del.
2003); United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1165-69 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 830-31 (plurality opinion), for a listing of state court
decisions utilizing the "special needs" analysis.
119 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 831 (plurality opinion).
120 See Green, 354 F.3d at 680-81 (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Groceman v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2004); Velasquez v.
Woods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07
(4th Cir. 1992); Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708
(S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2004); Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1343-44 (N.D.
Ga. 2003); United States v. Stegman, 295 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548-50 (D. Md. 2003);
United States v. Meier, No. 97-72, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25755 (D. Or. Aug. 6,
2002); United States v. Lujan, No. 98-480-02, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25754 (D. Or.
July 9, 2002); Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Kruger v.
Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995); Vanderlinden v. Kansas, 874 F. Supp.
1210 (D. Kan. 1995); Sanders v. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Ryncarz
v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1993). See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 831
(plurality opinion), for a listing of state court decisions utilizing the "totality of the
circumstances" test.
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pursuant to the DNA Act; thus, the Ninth Circuit erred in
utilizing this analysis in Kincade II.121 Furthermore, even if the
Ninth Circuit was correct in applying the "totality of the
circumstances" test, it reached the wrong outcome.1 22 Lastly,
employing the "totality of the circumstances" test in the arena of
suspicionless searches would lead to the downfall of many of the
precious protections of the Fourth Amendment-one huge reason
why it truly matters which approach is applied by courts when
considering the constitutionality of this search regime. 123
A. Precedent Does Not Support Use of the "Totality of the
Circumstances" Test
The Supreme Court has never used the "totality of the
circumstances" test to justify suspicionless law enforcement
searches like those pursuant to the DNA Act.1 24 The underlying
similarity in cases using the "totality of the circumstances"
approach to analyze searches is the existence of some level of
individualized suspicion.1 25 The "totality of the circumstances"
test is sometimes referred to as the "general Fourth Amendment
approach" because it is used as a guide for courts to determine
whether a search met the minimum level of suspicion required
under the Fourth Amendment, meaning whether a search was
supported by the requisite level of probable cause.1 26 Because
searches pursuant to the DNA Act are conducted in the absence
of any level of suspicion, they are not "normal" Fourth
Amendment cases to be governed by the "totality of the
circumstances" test.127 For programmatic, suspicionless searches
like those under the DNA Act to be upheld, they must fall into
one of the extremely limited categories warranting an exception
121 See infra Part III.A.
122 See infra Part III.B.
123 See infra Part III.C.
124 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 861 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
125 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1996) (explaining that the
traditional question of the "totality of the circumstances" approach is not whether a
police officer needed to have some level of suspicion before searching the car of a
speeding driver, but whether the officer had a sufficient level of suspicion to justify
the search).
126 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (declaring that the "totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis ... traditionally has informed probable-cause determinations").
127 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 862-63 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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to normal Fourth Amendment requirements. 128  There is a
different mode of analysis to apply to suspicionless searches-the
"special needs" approach129
-which is why the plurality in
Kincade H could not and did not cite to a single case that applied
the "totality of the circumstances" test to analyze a suspicionless
search.130 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit erred in refusing to draw
the crucial line between suspicion-based and suspicionless
searches, which "is as old as the Fourth Amendment and is
fundamental to the preservation of the privacy interests which
that provision protects."'13
The Kincade II plurality's sole reliance on a recent Supreme
Court case, United States v. Knights,132 which applied the
"totality of the circumstances" approach in a law enforcement
context, is misguided. 3 3  In Knights, the Supreme Court
considered whether a warrantless search of a probationer's home
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 34 The facts of
Knights are particularly important to distinguish this case from
Kincade I. While the defendant in Knights was on probation for
128 See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (explaining these extremely
limited categories).
129 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 860 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (commenting that
"[a]t least under [the special needs] doctrine, suspicionless searches are carefully
scrutinized and held constitutional only when they serve a valid special need apart
from law enforcement").
130 See id. at 861.
131 Id. at 863. The plurality refused to draw this line based on its interpretation
of Knights, which it felt "made clear" that this is not a line to be drawn-"at least not
when it comes to conditional releasees." Id. at 830 (plurality opinion).
132 534 U.S. 112 (2001). The Kincade H court admits that there are recent cases
that "may seem to be moving toward requiring that any search conducted primarily
for law enforcement purposes must be accompanied by at least some quantum of
individualized suspicion," but counters that the Knights decision "signal[s] the
existence of [the] possible limitations" of this proposition. Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 827
(plurality opinion).
133 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 861 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (adding that
Knights does not support the view, as implied by the plurality, that since the group
searched includes conditional releasees, the principles governing traditional Fourth
Amendment law can be disregarded). In response to the plurality's argument that
"conditional releasees' diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify
the judicial assessment of a parole or probation search's reasonableness outside the
strictures of special needs analysis," id. at 832 (plurality opinion), Judge Reinhardt
emphasized that this approach "dispenses with the structural guarantees that have
guided Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the Founding." Id. at 860
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
134 Knights, 534 U.S. at 122.
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an unrelated drug offense, law enforcement officers had
suspected him to have been involved in an arson resulting in $1.5
million in damages. 135 After observing the defendant's suspected
accomplice with explosive materials in his car, a law enforcement
official promptly executed a warrantless search of the defendant's
home, where incriminating evidence was found linking him to
the arson. 136  The defendant tried to suppress the evidence
obtained during the search on Fourth Amendment grounds. 137
After employing the "totality of the circumstances" test, the
Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of the
probationer's apartment was supported by "reasonable suspicion"
and that no more than that degree of suspicion was required to
validate the search. 138 However, the primary reason that the
Knights Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test is
simple: the warrantless search of the defendant's apartment was
supported by some level of individualized suspicion. 139 Of course,
135 Id. at 114.
136 Id. at 115.
137 Id. at 116.
138 See id. at 122. This is most notable because Knights was a probationer faced
with a probation condition that required him to submit to warrantless searches. See
id. at 119 (explaining that "Knights' status as a probationer subject to a search
condition informs both sides of [the totality of the circumstances] balance" and that
"[i]nherent in the very nature of probation is [the idea] that probationers 'do not
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every flaw-abiding] citizen is entitled"') (internal
quotation omitted) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)). The
Court balanced Knights' interest in privacy against the state's interest in searching
his home without a warrant to affirm the validity of this search. See id. at 119-21.
139 But see Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 829 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the
Court should not "be tempted to conclude that the quantum of suspicion supporting
the search of Knights's apartment was what pushed the Court beyond special needs
analysis" because the "special needs analysis [is] triggered not by a complete absence
of suspicion, but by a departure from the Fourth Amendment's warrant-and-
probable cause requirements"). The very language of the Supreme Court in Knights,
however, expressly validates this distinction:
We do not decide whether the probation condition so diminished, or
completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy ... that
a search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion
would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. The terms of the probation condition permit such a search,
but we need not address the constitutionality of a suspicionless search
because the search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6; see also id. at 121 (emphasizing the existence of
individualized suspicion based on the facts of the case). Hence, the Supreme Court in
Knights did not reach the question of whether searches of parolees and probationers
could lawfully be conducted in the absence of reasonable suspicion-further evidence
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this situation is not analogous to the facts of Kincade II, in which
no level of individualized suspicion was present before the search
was conducted. In addition, the plurality pointed to a recent
Supreme Court case, Griffin v. Wisconsin,140 which employed the
"special needs" approach to a warrantless search of a
probationer's apartment that was supported by reasonable
suspicion, to help justify its use of the "totality of the
circumstances" approach to a suspicionless search regime. 141 The
existence of this case, however, does not give courts carte blanche
to apply the approach of their choice to a suspicionless search;
this would be illogical. 142 Based on Supreme Court precedent,
suspicionless searches simply cannot be analyzed under the
"totality of the circumstances" approach, but rather must be
analyzed under the "special needs" approach. 143
B. The Ninth Circuit's Error-Filled Balancing Test
In mistakenly applying the "totality of the circumstances"
approach, the Ninth Circuit plurality in Kincade II concluded
that: (1) those who commit crimes have reduced expectations of
privacy; (2) the forcible extraction of blood is a minimal invasion
of privacy; and (3) the government's interest in DNA profiling is
"monumental"; thus, searches pursuant to the DNA Act are
constitutionally reasonable. 144 This conclusion, however, is both
laden with flaws and overly simplistic because when any search
is up against "monumental" government interests, it will be a
that this case is not on point. See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 862 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (summarizing that the Supreme Court's "willingness [in Knights] to
ignore the limitations imposed by the special needs doctrine" was because of "the
presence of individualized suspicion"). In fact, the Kincade I court interpreted
Knights to mean that reasonable suspicion must exist before the government may
compel parolees or probationers to submit to the suspicionless, forcible extraction of
blood. See Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1102.
140 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
141 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 824-25 (plurality opinion); see also infra Part
TV.C. (analyzing the rationale in Griffin).
142 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 863 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("The fact that a
suspicionless search must be justified on the basis of special needs in no way means
that a suspicion-supported search cannot be justified on that basis.").
143 See infra Part IV.A. In contrast, when a search is supported by
individualized suspicion, either doctrinal approach-the "totality of the
circumstances" test or the "special needs" analysis-is appropriate. See Kincade II,
379 F.3d at 863 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
144 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (explaining this holding).
[Vol. 79:769
THE FEDERAL DNA ACT
huge challenge for this balancing test ever to tip in favor of the
searched individual's privacy rights. Under the "totality of the
circumstances" approach, the forcible extraction of blood from
probationers for permanent retention should have been deemed
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
1. The Extent of Intrusion Is Far from Trivial
The plurality erroneously defined the Fourth Amendment
intrusion at issue in Kincade II as the simple physical piercing of
an individual's skin to extract his or her blood, and wrongly
concluded that this action constituted a "minimal" invasion of
privacy.145 The first problem with these determinations is that
although there are many Supreme Court cases that comment on
the non-intrusive nature of blood extractions, 146 none remotely
address the specific type of extraction at issue in Kincade II,
whereby the extracted blood is analyzed to create a DNA profile,
which is permanently stored on a government database,
subjected to unlimited re-testing, and exposed to potentially
severe unauthorized use.147 Obviously, the blood extraction in
Kincade H went far beyond the confines of the routine,
"commonplace"'148 blood extractions discussed in the cases used
by the plurality to support its assertion that a blood extraction is
"minimally invasive."1 49  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
recognized that certain physical intrusions, which require even
less bodily invasion than drawing blood, are
'severe ... intrusion[s] upon cherished personal security' that
145 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 836, 838 (plurality opinion).
146 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)
("[T]he intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant .. "); Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) (arguing that in "society's judgment [ ] blood tests do not
constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's personal privacy and
bodily integrity"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (noting that
"[blood] tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations"
and that there is a low risk of pain and infection resulting from them); Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) ('The blood test procedure has become routine in
our everyday life.").
147 For example, the intrusion at issue in Schmerber involved a blood sample
taken for evidence of inebriation at the time of the search. See Schmerber, 384 U.S.
at 768-69. This one-time use is strikingly different from the permanent retention of
an individual's DNA profile on a government database.
148 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
149 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 838 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 146-47 and
accompanying text.
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[are] subject to constitutional scrutiny."'150
More importantly, the power of technology has made
searches pursuant to the DNA Act far more intrusive and telling
than ever imaginable by the Founders of the Constitution, and
quite possibly, by the enactors of the DNA Act itself-and who
knows what potential the future holds?' 51 The DNA profile
derived from a forcible blood extraction does not merely
"establisho ... a record of the defendant's identity,"'152 as the
plurality contends, but rather has the potential to reveal a
multitude of private information about an individual, ranging
from his or her medical information, including predisposition to
150 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (internal citations omitted)
(referring to the fingernail scraping of a murder suspect for the purpose of gathering
his DNA without his consent).
151 See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Defendant/Appellant at 12, United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th
Cir. 2004) (No. 02-50380) (envisioning that "soon, if not already, scientists will
request access to what would serve as [a] preexisting goldmine of DNA data for their
research"); Motion of Protection & Advocacy, Inc. for Leave to File Brief of Amicus
Curiae Supporting Defendant/Appellant at 24, United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d
813 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-50380) (cautioning that "it is inevitable that as
technology advances, at some point, [the DNA samples] will be used for other
purposes without the consent or knowledge of the individual tested"); Brief for
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia as Amicu Curiae Supporting
Defendant/Appellant at 10, Kincade II, 379 F.3d 813 (No. 02-50380) (warning that
the government's retention of samples allows it to have at its disposal "the personal
medical information of thousands of its citizens, potentially retaining access to those
citizens' biological secrets for however long, and to whatever end, state authorities
see fit"); see also Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 842 n.3 (Gould, J., concurring) ("DNA stores
and reveals massive amounts of personal, private data.., and the advance of
science promises to make stored DNA only more revealing in time."). Judge Gould
further asserted:
In our age in which databases can be "mined" in a millisecond using
superfast computers, in which extensive information can, or potentially
could, be gleaned from DNA... and in which this data can easily be stored
and shared by governments and private parties worldwide, the threat of a
loss of privacy is real, even if we cannot yet discern the full scope of the
problem.
Id. at 842.
152 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 837 (plurality opinion); see id. at 837 n.32 ("Those
who have suffered a lawful conviction lose an interest in their identity to a degree
well-recognized as sufficient to entitle the government permanently to maintain a
verifiable record of their identity .... ); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir.
1995) ("Once a person is convicted of one of the felonies included as predicate
offenses under [Oregon's DNA Act], his identity has become a matter of state
interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying
information derived from the blood sampling.").
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certain diseases and psychological disorders, to his or her race,
sex, and even sexual orientation and propensity to engage in
criminal behavior.153 The government contended, and the
plurality agreed, that searches pursuant to the DNA Act are
simply a modern version of "fingerprint[ing]"; 154 however, this
comparison could not be further from the truth given that DNA
profiles, unlike fingerprints: (1) are attained by a physical
intrusion beneath the skin; (2) can be used to track an individual
153 See Motion of Protection & Advocacy, Inc. for Leave to File Brief of Amicus
Curiae Supporting Defendant/Appellant at 10-13, United States v. Kincade, 379
F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-50380) (citing studies that show that DNA profiles
can be used to study the connection between certain genes and the propensity for
social deviance, including socially disfavored behavior and criminal behavior);
Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 95-96 (1995) (disclosing that a DNA profile has the
potential to reveal "genetic defects, predisposition to diseases, and perhaps even
sexual orientation") (footnote omitted); Taylor, supra note 13, at 535 n.203 (noting
that many claim there are "genetic markers" in one's DNA for "aggression, substance
addiction, criminal tendencies, and sexual orientation") (quoting Letter from Peter J.
Neufeld, Innocence Project, Cardozo Law School, to Honorable John M. Leventhal 7
(Feb. 27, 2003) in support of Brief for New York Civil Liberties Union and Cardozo
Law School Innocence Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant, State v.
Rodriguez, 2003 WL 21276333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (No. 3177/2002)). The
government contends that the profiles stored on CODIS contain only an identifying
"fingerprint" and nothing else because only "junk DNA" samples, which have long
been assumed to be "non-genic," are analyzed. Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 818 (plurality
opinion). Non-genic stretches of DNA are supposedly not recognized as being
responsible for trait coding and 'were purposely selected because they are not
associated with any known physical or medical characteristics."' Id. (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000)). This declaration, however, has recently been
heavily disputed. See, e.g., Clive Cookson, Regulatory Genes Found in "Junk DNA,"
FIN. TIMES (London), June 4, 2004, at 11; Function Found for Junk DNA, L.A.
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at A14; W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the
Junk, SCI. AM., Nov. 2003, at 48; Justin Gillis, Genetic Code of Mouse Published;
Comparison with Human Genome Indicates "Junk DNA" May Be Vital, WASH. POST,
Dec. 5, 2002, at Al. In addition, it is already conceded that "junk DNA" can reveal
an individual's race and sex. See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 818 (plurality opinion).
154 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 818 (plurality opinion); see Denny Walsh, Judge
Finds DNA Testing Law Unconstitutional, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 6,
2002 (noting that a prosecutor even suggested that '[c]omparing fingerprints to
DNA is like comparing a slingshot to an atom bomb"'). The plurality also uses the
fact that parolees and supervised releasees have been subject to "more severe
intrusions of their corporeal privacy than a sterile blood draw," including cavity
searches, to support the minimal invasion of the search. Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 837
(plurality opinion) (commenting that these individuals leave prison desensitized to
such exposure). However, this argument is unconvincing. The search at issue is not
merely a "sterile blood draw," and furthermore, the invasive nature of this search
remains static regardless of one's status or degree of sensitivity to corporeal
searches.
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anywhere he or she goes; 155 and (3) have the potential to reveal
an endless amount of information about an individual. 156 To hold
that the search at issue in Kincade H is the mere extraction of
blood would ignore the escalating advancement of DNA-profiling
technology. Thus, the Ninth Circuit should have found that
searches conducted pursuant to the DNA Act are extremely
invasive.
2. The Plurality Understated Probationers' Expectations of
Privacy
The plurality also mistakenly equated a probationer's
diminished expectation of privacy with a complete elimination of
privacy expectations when it conducted its "totality of the
circumstances" balancing test. 157 It is well-established, based on
precedent, that probationers and parolees "are not entitled to the
full panoply of rights and protections possessed by the general
public," 158 and that due to this reduced privacy right, "the
government has a far more substantial interest in invading their
privacy than it does in interfering with the liberty of law-abiding
citizens."159  Depriving individuals on parole or supervised
release of "some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens,"1 60
155 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 838 n.37 (plurality opinion) (noting that it is
much more difficult to avoid leaving DNA at a crime scene than it is to avoid leaving
fingerprints, as the latter can be prevented simply by wearing gloves); see also supra
note 3 (explaining different forms of DNA evidence).
156 See Steinhardt Testimony, supra note 72 ("Fingerprints are two-dimensional
representations of the physical attributes of our fingertips. They are useful only as a
form of identification. DNA profiling may be used for identification purposes, but the
DNA itself represents far more than a fingerprint."); Hibbert, supra note 2, at 790
(explaining why DNA profiling is drastically different from fingerprinting); Taylor,
supra note 13, at 534-35 (arguing that a DNA sample reveals far more intimate
information than a traditional fingerprint because unlike a fingerprint, a person's
DNA profile can subject him or her to "embarrassment, humiliation, public hostility,
and even financial harm") (citation omitted).
157 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 833-36 (plurality opinion) (discussing a
probationer's diminished expectation of privacy).
158 Id. at 833; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)
(observing that probationers do not enjoy the same freedoms as law-abiding
citizens).
159 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 834 (plurality opinion) (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at
119-20; Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 n.15 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 874-75 (1987)).
160 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (emphasis added).
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however, is very different from depriving them of all freedoms.
161
In upholding searches pursuant to the DNA Act based largely on
the "reduced expectations of privacy" of parolees and
probationers, 162  the Ninth Circuit devastated this group's
essential Fourth Amendment protections and failed to give
sufficient credence to the significant privacy rights that this
group retains. 163
In addition, there exists one critical flaw in the Ninth
Circuit's utilization of Kincade's status as a probationer as "[of
central importance to [its] decision."' 64  Probationers and
parolees recover full privacy rights once they have paid their
debts to society and have exited the criminal justice system, yet
their DNA profiles are still plastered on CODIS, ready to
incriminate them and available for all sorts of re-testing and
improper use. 65 The plurality's analysis of this factor seems to
suggest that convicted qualifying offenders under the DNA Act
have reduced expectations of privacy forever, an assertion that
would run contrary to the fundamental principles of the
retributivist theory of punishment, which holds that although a
criminal is required to pay a debt to restore moral balance to
161 The plurality seems to eliminate completely the autonomy and privacy of
parolees and conditional releasees by declaring that the probation system "render[s]
all kinds of individual choices--choices that otherwise would be privately considered,
privately determined, and privately undertaken-matters of legitimate government
concern and investigation." Kincade I, 379 F.3d at 834 (plurality opinion).
162 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
plurality's view of a releasee's privacy expectations).
163 But see Kincade I, 379 F.3d at 835 (plurality opinion) (claiming that the
plurality's holding "in no way intimates that conditional releasees' diminished
expectations of privacy serve to extinguish their ability to invoke the protections of
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,"
especially since this group is afforded constitutional relief when a given search does
not satisfy the "totality of the circumstances" test, just as "any other citizen"). The
problem with this assertion by the plurality is that under the test and rationale it
espoused, it is hard to conjure up one search that would not satisfy the elastic
"totality of the circumstances" test.
164 Id. at 827-28.
165 It is interesting to consider whether each subsequent re-test or re-use of the
extracted blood sample would be deemed another search under the Fourth
Amendment. Courts have yet to address this issue; however, if each re-use was
deemed a subsequent search, and it took place while the probationer or parolee was
no longer within the criminal justice system, it seems fairly obvious that the most
important factor deemed by the court to tilt the "totality of the circumstances" test in
the government's favor-the reduced expectation of privacy of probationers-would
no longer be present. This would likely undermine the "reasonableness" of the test.
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society, once that wrongdoer has paid this debt, he or she can
return to society "free of moral guilt and stigma."166 In sum, the
plurality did not afford the privacy rights that probationers and
parolees retain, both during their time in the criminal justice
system and upon discharge, nearly enough attention.
3. The Plurality Exaggerated the Governmental and Public
Interests in DNA Act Searches
The plurality also incorrectly sided with the government
when it used very strong adjectives, such as "undeniably
compelling," "overwhelming," "enormous," and "monumental," to
describe the government's and public's normal, everyday interest
in the effectiveness of law enforcement. 167 Society's interests in
deterring crime, encouraging rehabilitation, and bringing closure
to victims are the basic fundamental goals of law enforcement.168
Searches pursuant to the DNA Act may expedite these goals, but
they do not change them inherently or make them any more
"compelling" or "monumental."
In addition, the government disingenuously argued and the
plurality readily accepted that searches pursuant to the DNA Act
serve the noble interest of helping to ensure that innocent people
166 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03, at 16-18 (3d ed.
2001). The basic principle of the retributivist theory is that punishment is not a
means of crime prevention, but a way to give a wrongdoer his or her "just deserts"
for his or her decision to violate society's mores. See id. § 2.03 at 16; 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a), at 42 (2d ed. 2003). See generally
JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 27-42,
46-50 (2d ed. 1991) (providing background on this theory of punishment). The DNA
Act, as currently structured, brands a kind of "scarlet letter" on those who are
subject to its searches by allowing the government to retain their DNA profiles and
blood samples forever-long after they have paid their debt to society. See
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 53 (Brian Harding ed., Oxford Univ.
Press, 2d ed. 1991) (1850) (using the term "scarlet letter" to describe a large red "A"
permanently placed on the dress of heroine Hester Prynne to mark her as an
adulteress). Therefore, these offenders do not enter society "free of moral guilt and
stigma," but are burdened and branded forever by the results of the authorized blood
extraction under the DNA Act.
167 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 838-39 (plurality opinion).
168 United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he traditional
purposes of punishment [are that] it can deter potential offenders, serve[ ] society's
legitimate interest in peaceful retribution, and ... be a useful step toward
rehabilitation.") (citing United States v. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. 563, 568 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)).
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are not wrongly convicted. 169 The structure of the DNA Act,
however, does not address this goal. There is no provision of the
DNA Act aimed at those who seek to prove their innocence
through DNA testing, and, additionally, there is no allocation of
funding to states or localities to provide this type of service to
those who are incarcerated. 170 Furthermore, the DNA Act has
the potential to do just the opposite: convict those who are
innocent, especially given the inevitable future expansion of
CODIS and the "legislative and citizen love affair with crime
fighting technology."'171 For example, those running searches
through CODIS could become so "match-happy" that once a "hit"
occurs, they may believe their search is over because they view a
database match as the most reliable, conclusive evidence of guilt
and, thus, wrongly convict one of the individuals on CODIS of the
crime who happened to be at the scene, but was not the actual
perpetrator. This situation is even more likely if the crime
occurred in a public area.
The deterrent effect of DNA profiling is equally overstated by
the plurality.1 72 First, the defendant Kincade posed a strong
argument about the "far-fetched" nature of the deterrent effect of
DNA profiling by stating that criminals will not think seriously
enough about the implications of the government's possession of
their DNA profile.1 73  Furthermore, knowledge that law
enforcement retains past offenders' fingerprints does not seem to
lead these offenders magically into lives devoid of criminal
activity. 174 Second, the very structure of the DNA Act and its
massive number of "qualifying offenses" suggest that deterring
future crime is an extremely questionable effect. Using a few of
the examples of "qualifying offenses" discussed supra in Part II,
does a person who gets into a fist-fight with his arch-rival, who
happens to be a mailman in the middle of his everyday delivery
169 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 839 n.38 (plurality opinion) (indicating that the
CODIS database can "clear[ ] thousands of potential suspects").
170 See id. at 869 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
171 Hibbert, supra note 2, at 768-69.
172 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 839 (plurality opinion) (explaining that DNA
profiling as a deterrent helps "to steer conditional releasees toward law-abiding lives
as productive members of our society").
173 See id. at 838 n.37. It would seem as though the opinion of Kincade himself
would be the most convincing and dependable because, after all, he was a convicted
criminal.
174 See id.
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route, truly need to be deterred from committing a future violent
crime? Or, does a college student who gets carried away while
engaged in an anti-war protest on the eve of an election really
need to be deterred from a future life of crime? The rationale of
the Ninth Circuit's plurality opinion implies that these questions
would be answered in the affirmative. The government's and
plurality's use of the deterrence-based argument is an insincere
attempt to boost the public's interest in DNA extraction,
especially when considered with the multitude of non-violent
"qualifying offenses" under the DNA Act, which, however
seriously they may be regarded, hardly necessitate the type of
future deterrence warranted for those who commit heinous,
violent crimes.
In conclusion, if the "totality of the circumstances" test were
to apply to the facts of Kincade II, the forcible extraction of blood
pursuant to the DNA Act should have been deemed
unconstitutional because: (1) the invasion of privacy caused by
the search is extensive; (2) probationers and parolees still
maintain some level of privacy expectations; and (3) the
government interest is no greater than the ordinary interest in
solving crimes.
C. Catastrophic Dangers of the "Totality of the Circumstances"
Test
If Supreme Court precedent ever established the
constitutionality of searches pursuant to the DNA Act under the
Ninth Circuit's "totality of the circumstances" approach, the
public would unfortunately be left "without the legal tools to halt
further abolition of [its] privacy rights."175 Because the "totality
of the circumstances" approach is extremely "malleable and
boundless,"'176 citizens would be forced to rely on the judiciary to
balance properly the importance of the general law enforcement
interest and the searched individual's privacy rights. And, so
long as courts, like the Ninth Circuit, deem ordinary law
enforcement interests as "monumental,"' 177 privacy rights would
continue to travel down "a dangerous path."'178 Frighteningly,
175 Id. at 870 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 860.
177 Id. at 839 (plurality opinion).
178 Id. at 863 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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under such a limitless legal standard as the "totality of the
circumstances" approach, invasive and arbitrary suspicionless
government actions would easily pass muster. 179 In addition,
given the importance that the Ninth Circuit placed on the
searched individual's reduced expectation of privacy, there would
be no reason not to extract blood forcibly from other groups of
individuals categorized by case law to possess similar diminished
privacy levels, such as public school students,180 drivers and
passengers of vehicles,' 8 ' and arrestees, 8 2 to name a few.
Furthermore, if the "totality of the circumstances" test can
justify suspicionless searches, what is left of our Fourth
Amendment protections? The most catastrophic potential of the
"totality of the circumstances" test is its ability to destroy the
Fourth Amendment's general requirement that searches be
based on individualized suspicion, which would then impliedly
permit any suspicionless law enforcement search. 8 3  It is
disturbing to imagine the possibilities of this type of regime,
especially when compared by Judge Reinhardt to the worlds
depicted by George Orwell's 1984,184 and the recent films
Minority Report8 5 and Gattaca,8 6 all three of which illustrate
179 Id. at 864. Clearly, such arbitrary and invasive suspicionless searches are
exactly what the Founding Fathers intended to prevent. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
180 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-32 (2002) (holding that public
school students have a diminished expectation of privacy and that students who
voluntarily participate in extracurricular activities possess an even lower degree of
privacy).
181 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (holding that drivers
and passengers have less privacy rights when traveling on public roadways);
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (holding that automobiles are
highly regulated and therefore drivers and passengers have less privacy rights).
182 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (finding arrestees'
privacy rights to be slightly reduced).
183 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 864 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
184 See id., 379 F.3d at 870 (stating "1984 arrives twenty years later than
predicted"). Judge Reinhardt is alluding to George Orwell's 1984, a book that depicts
a country with a government that censors all of its citizens' thoughts and behaviors.
See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin Books 1950), available at http://www.online-
literature.com/orwell/1984/.
185 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 851 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (discussing MINORITY
REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox and Dreamworks, LLC 2002), a movie that depicts
a world where individuals are arrested before they commit a particular crime due to
a sort of future-viewing technology).
186 Id. (reviewing GATTACA (Columbia TriStar Studios 1997), a movie that
depicts a world in which the government analyzes its citizens' DNA and determines
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the disastrous consequences of authorized and severe
governmental access and invasion of the privacy of its citizens.
In short, the "totality of the circumstances" approach, if applied
to suspicionless searches, would erode our democratic values and
protections and leave us helplessly "look[ing] back" and asking
"when did this happen-why didn't we understand before it was
too late?"18 7
IV. THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" APPROACH-THE BETTER CHOICE
The lack of binding precedent to permit the use of the
"totality of the circumstances" test in the context of suspicionless
law enforcement searches, considered together with the
consequential dangers of employing this approach, establish just
a few reasons why another mode of analysis must govern this
difficult issue. In contrast to the vague "totality of the
circumstances" balancing test, the "special needs" approach is
supported by precedent, adheres more closely to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and involves much
greater constitutional scrutiny of the search at issue. In
addition, the principles at the heart of the "special needs"
doctrine illustrate why courts use, albeit incorrectly, the "totality
of the circumstances" approach to justify searches pursuant to
the DNA Act: these searches simply do not fall within the
"special needs" exception to the warrant-and-probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Fundamentals of the "Special Needs" Doctrine
The "special needs" doctrine can be labeled as the
established framework used by the Supreme Court to analyze
suspicionless searches.188 There are many cases that predate the
first use of the phrase "special needs" 18 9 in which the Supreme
Court has upheld suspicionless non-law enforcement search
regimes.' 90 "Special needs" cases involve searches whose primary
their life expectancies and likelihoods for disease in order to genetically discriminate
against them).
187 Id. at 869.
188 Id. at 854.
189 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
19o See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text. Although this Comment
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purpose is not to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, but rather to address some need "beyond the normal
need for law enforcement."' 191 For example, under the "special
needs" doctrine, the Supreme Court has upheld random,
suspicionless, drug testing of public school students who
participate in extracurricular activities because the results are
not turned over to any law enforcement agency. 192 The Supreme
Court has also upheld suspicionless drug testing of certain U.S.
Customs officials 193 because the "results may not be used [against
the employee] in a criminal prosecution." 194 The Supreme Court,
however, has never approved a suspicionless search regime
designed to pursue normal, ordinary law enforcement objectives;
this is the paradigmatic category of searches that are intolerable
under the "special needs" doctrine. 195  Stated differently, no
divided lawful suspicionless searches into three categories, the Supreme Court has
suggested that the "administrative" and "border search" categories, which are mostly
made up of cases that pre-date the use of the "special needs" doctrine, could be
classified as "special needs" cases as well. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000) (explaining that the border search line of cases can be
deemed "special needs" cases because they involved suspicionless search programs
"whose primary purpose was [not] to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing'); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987) (explaining that the
administrative search line of cases present situations of valid "special needs").
191 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351.
192 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002); cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 n.2 (1995) (upholding a program that subjected
student athletes to random, suspicionless drug testing because the search was
undertaken for "prophylactic and distinctly nonpunitive purposes") (emphasis
added). In Earls, the search regime was justified based on the "special need" to
ensure the safety and health of students in a setting where adherence to the normal
warrant-and-probable cause requirement is impracticable. See Earls, 536 U.S. at
829-38.
193 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989);
see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989)
(upholding compulsory blood and urine testing of railroad employees involved in
certain train accidents). The Court upheld the search regimes in Von Raab and
Skinner based on the "special needs" of protecting the integrity of the front lines in
the war on drugs and gathering reliable data on train accidents caused by substance
abuse, respectively. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612, 618-21.
194 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666.
195 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 (noting that the results
of the urinalysis "are not turned over to law enforcement authorities"); Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 679 (upholding a testing program because it was "not designed to serve
the ordinary needs of law enforcement"); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21 (emphasizing
safety as a "special need" beyond law enforcement); see also infra notes 203-09 and
accompanying text (suggesting that there is a distinction under the "special needs"
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programmatic suspicionless search is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment unless its purpose is "divorced from the
State's general interest in law enforcement."'196 This limitation
on the "special needs" exception is derived from the Framers'
historic mistrust of placing excessive power in the hands of law
enforcement.197 Accordingly, any effort via a search to obtain
information related to a possible crime that the searched
individual may have committed or may commit in the future does
not fall within the extremely limited "special needs" exception to
the warrant-and-probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.198
With this framework in mind, there are two recent Supreme
Court cases from the 2000-2001 term that prove devastating to
the constitutionality of searches under the DNA Act: City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond,199 which struck down a vehicle
checkpoint policy by holding that the usual requirement of
individualized suspicion cannot be suspended in situations where
the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily to uncover
ordinary evidence of crimes,200  and Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,20 which overturned non-consensual hospital urine
drug testing of pregnant women with the purpose of arresting
and prosecuting women who tested positive for narcotics
violations. 202 In these two cases, the Supreme Court established
exactly how to analyze a search regime under the "special needs"
doctrine. Whether or not a search falls under the "special needs"
exception depends on its relevant "primary purpose" 20 3 or,
synonymously, its "immediate objective."20 4  If a given
warrantless and suspicionless search's primary purpose or
doctrine between searches conducted for the purpose of solving or punishing crime
and those conducted without the involvement of some punitive consequence).
196 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001).
197 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 42 (disapproving of suspicionless searches that
are justified by a "general interest in crime control" because, if allowed, such
intrusions would become "a routine part of American life").
198 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-25 (2004) (explaining this principle as it
relates to an "information-seeking stop").
199 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
200 Id. at 37-38.
201 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
202 Id. at 82-84.
203 Id. at 81; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38.
204 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83.
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immediate objective is "to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes,"20 5 then it does not meet the "special needs" exception
and is unconstitutional. 20 6 Courts are given the flexibility to
consider all available evidence to reach the determination of a
search's primary purpose. 20 7 The Court in Ferguson also warned
about the "critical" distinction between an alleged ultimate goal
of the programmatic search regime and the immediate objective
of the search, especially because nearly any "law enforcement
involvement always serves some broader social purpose or
objective. ' 208 This "crucial" distinction can be applied neatly to
the searches authorized by the DNA Act: their immediate
purpose is to solve crime, but their broader goal is to reduce
recidivism through deterrence. 20 9  Therefore, based on the
Supreme Court precedent set by Edmond and Ferguson, when
applying the "special needs" approach, the immediate purpose of
the DNA Act-to solve crime-is the linchpin of the analysis.
Because searches pursuant to the DNA Act are suspicionless
and warrantless, the Ninth Circuit-and other courts that
205 Id. at 83-84 (indicating that "the extensive involvement of law enforcement
officials at every stage of the policy" means that the search "simply does not fit
within the closely guarded category of 'special needs"'); see also id. at 81, 83 n.20.
The Court in Edmond stated that it refused to permit a "general interest in crime
control" as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
206 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-86; see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419,
423-27 (2004). The Court in Ferguson was compelled to emphasize this rule by
italicizing the words "law enforcement purposes" to ensure that its reasoning was
not "misunderstood" because "[i]n none of [its] previous special needs cases ha[d]
[the Court] upheld the collection of evidence for criminal law enforcement purposes."
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 & n.20 (citation omitted).
207 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81. The Court in Edmond concluded that
individualized suspicion is required for suspicionless searches "whose primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." Edmond, 531 U.S.
at 41. The Court further added:
[I]n determining whether individualized suspicion is required, we must
consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the
particular law enforcement practices at issue. We are particularly reluctant
to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion
where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime
control ends.
Id. at 42-43.
208 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-84.
209 It can also be argued that both solving crime and reducing recidivism is
related to law enforcement, regardless of the distinction between ultimate and
immediate purpose. See Kincade I, 345 F.3d at 1112 (arguing that the "special
needs" exception is inapplicable to DNA Act searches because "[b]oth the 'immediate
purpose' and the 'ultimate objective'.., are to further law enforcement ends").
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embrace the "totality of the circumstances" test 210-should have
analyzed this issue under the lens of the "special needs" doctrine.
In correctly doing so, the Ninth Circuit and its counterparts
would have found that searches under the DNA Act are
unconstitutional because they are conducted for the primary and
immediate purpose of solving crimes.21' Furthermore, this
Comment argues that courts facing this reality, but
simultaneously desiring to uphold the DNA Act searches, were
forced to find a clever way to avoid the "special needs" doctrine
and employ the "totality of the circumstances" approach. It is
only under the latter doctrine that these searches had a remote
chance of surviving constitutional scrutiny. But, as illustrated in
Part III.B of this Comment, even the "totality of the
circumstances" test should likewise disclose that searches under
the DNA Act are unconstitutional.
B. The Kincade H Plurality Wrongly Defined the Purpose of
Searches Under the DNA Act
Although the Ninth Circuit plurality in Kincade II did not
subscribe to the "special needs" approach, it nonetheless
mistakenly defined the purpose of searches under the DNA
Act. 21 2 The Ninth Circuit, while examining the public interest in
DNA Act searches during its "totality of the circumstances"
balancing, indirectly asserted its view that the purpose of DNA
Act searches is to foster "the rehabilitative goal of our systems of
conditional release"21 3 of "reducing recidivism" 21 4 through the
"deterrent effect of such profiling."215  Similarly, Judge Gould,
while advocating the use of the "special needs" exception to
validate this search regime in his concurring opinion, believed
that the DNA Act searches serve the "special needs of a
supervised release system" by "monitoring convicts on supervised
release and deterring their possible recidivism."21 6 It is obvious
210 See supra note 118 (listing these courts).
211 See infra Part TV.B.
212 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 838-39 (plurality opinion).
213 Id. at 839.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 838. The Ninth Circuit continued to say that these interests are
"intimately related to the core purposes of conditional release: rehabilitating
convicted offenders and sheltering society from future victimization." Id. at 839.
216 Id. at 840 (Gould, J., concurring).
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through examination of the legislative and executive branches'
interpretation of the DNA Act, however, that its authorized
searches serve the primary purpose of solving past and future
crimes-the quintessential law enforcement purpose. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit itself tellingly admits in Kincade II that searches
under the DNA Act "contribut[e] to.the solution of past crimes" 217
and "layo a foundation for solving those crimes that are not
successfully deterred by the collection of DNA profiles," 218 which
can easily be simplified to mean that the searches help solve
future crimes as well. This contention is well supported by the
DNA Act's legislative history, as well as the executive branch's
interpretation of the purpose of searches under the DNA Act.
These two consistent interpretations will each be considered
briefly to reveal the Ninth Circuit's clear error in Kincade II by
impliedly stating, and expressly maintaining, as in Judge Gould's
concurrence, that the primary purpose of searches pursuant to
the DNA Act is to foster the rehabilitative goal of the system of
supervised release by deterring recidivism.21 9
The legislative history of the DNA Act is replete with
evidence that Congress' primary concern was to assist in the
solving of crimes. 220  For example, legislators in various
congressional hearings have stated that the purpose of adding
profiles into CODIS is to "solve crimes and prevent further
crimes" 221 and "to match DNA samples from crime scenes where
there are no suspects with the DNA of convicted offenders." 222 In
addition, one senator praised the DNA Act as "a huge asset
for... local law enforcers in their day-to-day fight against
crime,"223 and another applauded this "[m]odern crime-fighting
217 Id. at 839 (plurality opinion).
218 Id.
219 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (summarizing the Ninth
Circuit's view).
220 See DNA Act House Report, supra note 3, at 8-11, 23-27, 32-36 (referring to
the use of DNA profiles derived from DNA Act searches to solve and prosecute
crimes). See generally Carnahan, supra note 91, at 37-38 (arguing that the
"legislative history of the [DNA] Act overwhelmingly support[s] crime-solving as its
primary purpose" and thus, the DNA Act is unconstitutional under the "special
needs" doctrine).
221 146 CONG. REC. S11647 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
222 146 CONG. REC. H8575-76 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Canady).
223 146 CONG. REC. S11646 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
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technology" for "mak[ing] law enforcement much more
effective." 224  Furthermore, a House of Representatives
committee report on the DNA Act even expressly stated that "one
of the underlying concepts behind CODIS is to create a database
of convicted offender profiles and use it to solve crimes for which
there are no suspects. 226
The executive branch's interpretation of searches under the
DNA Act further supports the legislative history showing that
the DNA Act was implemented to solve crimes. The Department
of Justice has stated that CODIS is a "powerful crimefighting
tool for law enforcement," 226 and former Attorney General John
Ashcroft has stated that 'DNA technology can operate as a kind
of truth machine, ensuring justice by identifying the guilty and
clearing the innocent."' 227 In addition, an even more persuasive
indicator of the executive branch's interpretation of the DNA Act
and the CODIS database is how it chooses to measure the
ultimate success of the program: "by the [number of] crimes it
helps to solve."228
Furthermore, during legislative hearings, the Department of
Justice had to address the issue of whether or not the DNA
information collected from offenders would be used for insurance
224 146 CONG. REC. S11648 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000)(statement of Sen. Kohl).
225 See DNA Act House Report, supra note 3, at 27; see also 146 CONG. REC.
H12032 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000) (statement of Rep. Gilman) (arguing that the CODIS
database is essential "to assist... in fighting violent crime" and that "DNA evidence
is becoming a more important tool to our Nation's law enforcement in solving
crimes").
226 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 2;
see also id. at 4 (adding that DNA databases allow unsolved cases "to remain active"
by giving them "the chance to be solved through the DNA database in the future");
id. at 9 (commenting that CODIS has "greatly enhanced law enforcement's ability to
solve cold cases with DNA"); FBI's CODIS Program, supra note 91 (stating that
CODIS "blends forensic science and computer technology into an effective tool for
solving violent crimes").
227 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 856 n.15 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
Dep't. Acts to Clear DNA Backlog, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 2, 2001, at 19A); see also
U.S. Attorney General Announces $95 Million in Grants to Improve DNA Crime
Analysis, PATIENT CARE L. WKLY., Oct. 17, 2004, at 8 ('DNA analysis helps identify
the guilty, it helps vindicate the innocent, and at times, it can bring a sense of peace
and justice to victims and their families even after a case has seemed to [have] gone
cold and hope was all that they had left."' (alteration in original) (quoting former
Attorney General John Ashcroft)).
228 FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM PROGRAM:
CODIS-MEASURING SUCCESS, available at http://fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/success.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
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or medical purposes and responded by saying that "existing legal
rules for the DNA identification system generally ensure that
DNA samples and indexed information will be used solely for law
enforcement identification purposes.'"229 In fact, according to
Judge Reinhardt's dissent, at the outset of litigation the
government claimed that the purpose of the DNA Act is to 'help
law enforcement solve unresolved and future cases,"' but then
changed its tune in a supplemental en banc brief by "recast[ing]
the purpose of the DNA Act purely in terms of meeting the
supervisory needs of the parole and probation systems."230 There
are also other federal cases addressing the constitutionality of
DNA Act searches in which the government argued that the
primary purpose of the DNA Act is to solve past and future
crimes. 231
To conclude, the government and the Ninth Circuit confuse
an ultimate, broad goal of the DNA Act, which is to reduce
recidivism through deterrence, with the immediate and primary
purpose of searches under the DNA Act, which is to construct a
national database aimed at solving past and future crimes.
23 2
Moreover, the legislative history and executive branch's
interpretation of the DNA Act make the government's contention
and the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the DNA Act's primary
purpose is to reduce recidivism through deterrence appear far
less credible and simply disingenuous. Finally, given that there
229 DNA Act House Report, supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis added) (quoted in
Kincade I, 345 F.3d at 1111).
230 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 856 & n.14 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). In Kincade I, the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel stated:
The government argues that two purposes of searches pursuant to the
[DNA] Act are to "help law enforcement solve unresolved and future cases,"
and to increase accuracy in the criminal justice system. The government's
own argument establishes that prototypical law enforcement purposes
underlie the DNA searches in question. Under the government's own
theory, the searches are conducted in order to collect DNA evidence
samples for CODIS, so that those samples may be used in criminal
investigations, to help solve crimes and prosecute the culprits, and to
enable law enforcement agencies to be more accurate and effective in
achieving their law enforcement objectives.
KincadeI, 345 F.3d at 1110.
231 See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138-39 (E.D. Cal.
2002); United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
232 See Carnahan, supra note 91, at 36 (concluding that the primary purpose of
CODIS is simply to solve crime).
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is "extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every
stage" of the DNA Act's search regime and that the immediate
objective of DNA Act searches is to generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes, these searches simply cannot fit "within
the closely guarded category of 'special needs.' ' 233
C. Distinguishing Griffin
The Ninth Circuit should have applied the "special needs"
analysis to the facts of Kincade H without relying in error on the
Supreme Court case Griffin v. Wisconsin,234 which upheld a
warrantless search of a probationer's home based on the 'special
needs' of the state, beyond [that of] normal law enforcement," 235
to operate its probation system and "to assure that the
restrictions [of probation] are in fact observed."236 In Griffin, a
detective contacted the supervisor of appellant Griffin's probation
officer with a tip that Griffin might have had weapons in his
apartment. 237  Acting on this information, the supervisor,
together with another probation officer and three undercover
policemen, conducted a warrantless search of the appellant's
apartment, which uncovered a weapon and led to his arrest.238
The appellant moved to suppress the evidence due to the
warrantless nature of this search, which the Supreme Court
rejected after upholding its constitutionality under the "special
needs" doctrine. 239 Notwithstanding the fact that Griffin was
decided before the Supreme Court further clarified the "special
needs" doctrine in Edmond and Ferguson, there are three
reasons that Griffin simply cannot be used to validate the
constitutionality of searches pursuant to the DNA Act.
First, the primary purposes of the searches in Griffin and
Kincade H are entirely different. Unlike the search regime in
Griffin, whose primary purpose was to assist in the supervision
of releasees, the primary purpose of searches under the DNA Act
is to collect information to solve and prosecute crimes. 240 The
233 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
234 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
235 Id. at 873-74.
236 Id. at 875.
237 See id. at 871.
238 See id. at 870-72.
239 See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
240 See supra Part 1.B.
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Court in Griffin stated that "[iln some cases-especially those
involving drugs or illegal weapons-the probation agency must
be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the
Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to
intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or
society."'241 However, based on the facts of Kincade II, and most
likely any other forcible DNA extraction under the DNA Act, no
such emergency or imminent need exists to justify the type of
relaxation of the usual warrant-and-probable cause requirement
that took place in Griffin. Furthermore, unlike the case in
Griffin, searches under the DNA Act, as in Kincade II, are not
conducted to investigate a specific criminal activity.242
Second, there is a significant difference in the time-frame of
the searches conducted in Griffin and in Kincade II, which
further illustrates that the primary purposes of the search
regimes in these two cases are not synonymous. In Griffin, the
search was temporary and conducted within the finite period of
appellant's probation, while the search in Kincade II was
permanent and could be performed continuously for an infinite
period after Kincade's exit from the criminal justice system.243
Lastly, the relevance of an individual's status within the
probation system would not have been as crucial to the analysis
of the search regime under the "special needs" approach in
Kincade II as it was in Griffin. The warrantless searches were
upheld in Griffin largely due to the "special needs" of the
probation system to supervise its releasees by ensuring that all of
the restrictions of probation are properly obeyed.244 The DNA
241 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879.
242 See id. at 871 (noting that the Court was confronting a search regime that
required reasonable suspicion before any search could be conducted). Thus, searches
in Griffin were designed to check on individual probationers who were suspected of
violating the terms of their conditional release. No such suspicion exists in the
search regime authorized by the DNA Act.
243 This is referring to the fact that the extraction of blood for DNA analysis can
be re-tested and re-run through the CODIS database forever. See Kincade II, 379
F.3d at 870 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (contending that once Kincade's period of
supervisory release ends, "the state will cease to have a supervisory interest over
[him,] [y]et... by the terms of the DNA Act, [he] will effectively be compelled to
provide evidence with respect to any and all crimes of which he may be accused for
the rest of his life" even though the government may have no reason to suspect him).
244 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75 (noting that a probationer enjoys only
"'conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation]
restrictions' . . . meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine
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Act cannot be upheld on this basis, however, because it applies to
an endless number of individuals who are convicted of its
"qualifying offenses," irrespective of whether they are
incarcerated or on parole, probation, or supervised release. 245
Thus, there is a "highly attenuated" 246 link between an
individual's status as a supervised releasee and the activation of
the DNA Act. The search regime authorized under the DNA Act
does not solely address the supervision of probationers like the
warrantless search of the probationer's home in Grffin. Because
Griffin is inapplicable to the facts of Kincade II, Ferguson and
Edmond remain the most recent and appropriate precedent to
guide the "special needs" analysis of searches pursuant to the
DNA Act. As previously established by this Comment, these two
cases prove that the search regime in Kincade II cannot be
justified under the "special needs" doctrine. 247
V. NECESSARY MEASURES
This Comment seeks to establish that the forcible extraction
of blood pursuant to the DNA Act, as currently written and
implemented, is unconstitutional under either the "totality of the
circumstances" test or the "special needs" approach. However,
given the admitted success of the DNA Act in solving some
violent and heinous crimes24 -those that the DNA Act originally
intended to assist 249-courts seem to be unwilling to strike down
rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer's being at
large" (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480
(1972)).
245 In fact, based on the government's statistics, the majority of blood
extractions under the DNA Act take place in prison. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2002 65 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/cfjs02.pdf (noting
that in 2002, seventy-five percent of convicted federal offenders were sentenced to
prison, while only seventeen percent were sentenced to probation).
246 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 859 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
247 See supra Part IV.A-B.
248 See FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM PROGRAM:
CODIS-MEASURING SUCCESS, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hqflab/codis/
success.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005) (indicating that as of August 2004, CODIS
has produced over 16,600 hits assisting in more than 19,600 investigations); see also
FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM PROGRAM: CODIS 5
(2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/brochure.pdf (providing a
description of three specific success stories).
249 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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searches made pursuant to it as unconstitutional, and have
instead resorted to discovering creative, yet unconvincing, ways
to make them consistent with established Supreme Court
precedent. The many courts that continue to uphold searches
under the DNA Act allow the legislature to ignore the many
practical and constitutional problems with this law, and worse,
permit the citizens of this country to slide further down the
slippery slope reducing their Fourth Amendment protections.
Despite these unfortunate effects, there are actions that the
Supreme Court could take and improvements to the DNA Act
that the legislature could make, which may tame the opponents
of the DNA Act and enable the searches to comport better with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
First, the Supreme Court must put an end to the use of the
"totality of the circumstances" test to analyze the
constitutionality of searches under the DNA Act.250 So long as
the "totality of the circumstances" test is available to courts due
to no express Supreme Court holding to the contrary, circuits will
continue to align and uphold the constitutionality of the DNA
Act, especially during a time in our history when national
security is of paramount concern. Given the severe implications
of the "totality of the circumstances" test, the Supreme Court
must put its foot down quickly before more individuals are
subject to DNA profiling and more intrusive suspicionless
government searches are permitted under this limitless test.
To accomplish this goal, the Supreme Court must either
strike down these searches as unconstitutional or carve out a new
Fourth Amendment exception to the warrant-and-probable cause
requirement. 251 The most likely option would be the latter, given
the excessive enthusiasm about DNA profiling technology and,
concededly, its success in assisting law enforcement in catching
violent criminals. However, if the Supreme Court did create a
new exception to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
which has not been done in decades, 252 it must place significant
limitations on the extent of its application in order to prevent
CODIS from expanding even further, and equally important, to
250 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court passed on this opportunity by denying
Kincade's petition for a writ of certiorari. See supra note 45.
251 See Carnahan, supra note 91, at 35 (considering the latter option).
252 See id.
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protect our rights against invasive government searches. The
legislature should foresee the Supreme Court's imminent
predicament and make some essential revisions to the DNA Act
to allow for an easier judicial resolution of this issue.
The legislature should first reconstruct the DNA Act to
match its legislative history. This means that the "qualifying
offenses" under the DNA Act must be redefined to include only
the most violent and egregious crimes that have verifiable high
rates of recidivism.2 53 In addition, the legislature should resist
the urge to allow the DNA Act to apply to all arrestees. This
measure would not only be contrary to our constitutional
guarantee that we are "innocent until proven guilty," but would
also be inconsistent with the contention that the DNA Act
reduces recidivism through deterrence. 254 When an individual is
merely arrested for any crime, it is completely uncertain whether
he or she needs to be deterred from actually committing crimes in
the future. Thus, fingerprinting should suffice as our country's
standard for identifying arrestees, especially given that blood
extraction for DNA profiling is a far greater intrusion on an
individual's privacy expectations. 255
If the DNA Act continues to expand to apply to more and
more offenses, the legislature, together with the Department of
Justice, should make CODIS more of a "revolving" database. In
other words, the DNA Act should only permit use of qualifying
offenders' DNA profiles during their time within the criminal
justice system. Once an offender pays his or her debt to society
and exits the system, his or her DNA profile and blood sample
should be promptly and efficiently expunged. This would address
253 See Press Release, ACLU, DNA Databases Hold More Dangers Than Meet
the Eye, ACLU Says (Mar. 23, 2000), available at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/
privacy.cfm?ID=7886&c=129 (stating that the ACLU urged the House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Crime "to ensure that any proposal it adopts
include[s] measures to guarantee that only persons convicted of serious violent
felonies have their DNA entered into CODIS" when it considered the DNA Act). See
generally Hibbert, supra note 2, at 816-17 (suggesting that public policy demands
the government to limit DNA databanks only to those who have proven to be a
"serious threat to public safety and, as a class, have a high rate of recidivism").
254 See Porteus, supra note 99 ("It's very troubling when people who are
arrested would have to give up their DNA. Those people are simply innocent until
proven guilty." (quoting Larry Kobilinsky, forensic science expert at John Jay
College)); see also supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (describing this
argument in more detail).
255 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
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many of the factors cutting against the constitutionality of the
search under the "totality of the circumstances" test. By not
allowing the blood sample and DNA profile to be retained forever,
the potential for its misuse is reduced and the search itself
becomes less intrusive. In addition, this measure seems more
consistent with the expectations of privacy experienced by those
in prison, or on parole, probation, and supervised release because
once these individuals are afforded the complete restoration of
their privacy rights, their extracted blood sample, along with the
results of the search, can no longer be used against them or by
the government for an impermissible purpose. Furthermore,
under the "special needs" analysis, this measure would make the
government's contention that the DNA Act addresses the special
needs of the probation system through deterrence seem much
more sincere because the DNA Act would no longer apply to
those who have left the criminal justice system. Concededly,
ensuring the proper and speedy expulsion of DNA samples may
cost the government more time, money, and resources. If this
measure is combined with the last suggestion to reduce the
number of "qualifying offenses," however, testing for fewer crimes
will offset this loss. Moreover, if the government wants to invest
billions of dollars to create a system that increases the efficiency
of law enforcement, surely it should be willing to make some
sacrifices to ensure that the Constitution-the very foundation of
our country-is respected.
Lastly, the legislature must revise the DNA Act to address
more adequately the enormous amount of consequential privacy
concerns. The best way to accomplish this is by increasing the
criminal penalty for unauthorized use under the DNA Act.
Currently, the DNA Act's only penalty for unauthorized use of a
DNA profile or blood sample is a fine "not more than $100,000.256
Shockingly, the DNA Act sets a ceiling for the amount of the fine
that can be imposed for this offense, which means that the
penalty can be anything less than this amount, or even just a
mere slap on the wrist. At the very least, a $100,000 fine should
be the minimum penalty for this type of serious, irreparable
crime. Instead, this minute penalty sends a clear message to the
public that the government does not take our genetic privacy
256 42 U.S.C. § 14133(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
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rights very seriously. A fine of not more than $100,000 simply
does not seem to be enough to deter someone from sharing the
DNA profiles or blood samples of others with employers,
insurance companies, scientists, or any other group waiting to
put them to devastating and discriminating use.
CONCLUSION
It is extremely tempting to wholeheartedly support the DNA
Act and decisions like Kincade H because of the track record of
success that the CODIS database has experienced. 257 A law
enforcement search regime's success, however, reveals absolutely
nothing about its constitutionality. Moreover, it is undeniable
that if CODIS contained DNA profiles of the entire population
and if "we [were] willing to sacrifice all of our interests in privacy
and personal liberty,"258 crimes would be resolved more easily,
more efficiently, and more effectively. But, as Judge Reinhardt
eloquently stated in his Kincade II dissent, "[t]hose who won our
independence chose, however, not to follow that course but
instead to provide us with the safeguards contained in the
Fourth Amendment."259  We must cherish these Fourth
Amendment safeguards and try to look past the attempts of
decisions such as Kincade I to justify DNA profiling to see the
bigger, more disturbing picture of a world without these Fourth
Amendment protections.
The DNA Act gives society a false feeling of security because
its dangers and repercussions have been overlooked or
consciously avoided. The government and legislature have fooled
us all by portraying the DNA Act as simply being a revolutionary
tool to fight the war against crime. They neglect to recognize the
DNA Act's lack of adherence to our constitutional protections and
established Fourth Amendment precedent, its vastly expanded
"laundry list" of federal offenses that qualify an individual for
DNA extraction, and its potential to breed misuse of the
extracted DNA for purposes like genetic discrimination at the
257 See supra note 248; see also Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 870 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) ('We all desire more effective law enforcement, less recidivism, and
'closure' for victims of heinous crimes. But that desire does not justify eviscerating
the structural edifices of the Fourth Amendment.").
258 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 869 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
259 Id.
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hands of employers or insurance companies. Most insulting of
all, they neglect to inform us that our genes-the genes of law
abiding citizens-are the future of CODIS, a system which they
admit is only as effective as the number of profiles it contains.
For a country that prides itself on liberty-and puts the lives of
its citizens on the line to bring liberty to others-this would be an
inconsistent and bold step that would place our closely guarded
privacy rights in a complete state of disarray. However, this
Comment argues that the government does not need to extend
CODIS to the entire population to accomplish this result; our
privacy rights are already in a complete state of disarray
because, as Kincade II illustrates, "[t]he erosion of conditional
releasees' liberty makes us all less free" and "opt[ing] for
comprehensive DNA profiling of the least protected among
us ... has jeopardized us all."260 This could not have been the
intention of our country's Founding Fathers when they drafted
the Fourth Amendment-even if they could have predicted the
astonishing advancement and incredible value of the double-
edged sword that is technology.
260 Id. at 871; see also Richard Willing, White House Seeks To Expand DNA
Database, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2003 ("'[Nlot too long ago they were saying they'd
only take DNA profiles from rapists and murderers, and now they want
juveniles.... We're not just on a slippery slope, we're halfway down it."' (quoting
Barry Steinhardt, privacy specialist for the ACLU)).
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